Europe, Greece, and Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation

ASSOCIATION OF MPs AND MEPs

Committee on European Affairs

19 March 2009

“EUROPE, GREECE AND EUROMEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION”

Anna Karamanou, former MEP

INTRODUCTION

The Mediterranean has always been a crossroads of meeting different cultures, commercial transactions, but also a space for violent confrontations and conflicts. As a connecting link among the peoples of Europe, Africa, and Asia, it attracted the intense interest of the EU, which very early on realized that prosperity, development, and stability in Europe largely depend on its surroundings.

For this reason, the fate of the Mediterranean countries has always been at the center of its interest. The Barcelona Process or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995) represents the culmination of efforts, at an institutional level, to establish a climate of cooperation and peaceful coexistence. In the Barcelona Process, for the first time, the Union’s willingness to develop a partnership with the Mediterranean states is officially recorded, definitively ending the ad hoc bilateral relations of the past.

Especially after the historical upheavals that followed the end of the Cold War, the interdependent relations between the European Union and the Mediterranean countries became more intense. Today, the Mediterranean countries (at least those that are not EU members) constitute one of the largest trading partners of the Union, after the EFTA countries and the USA. Furthermore, the continuously growing energy dependence of the Community on the broader Mediterranean region gives them particular strategic importance.

HISTORICAL

The commercial and political relations of the Community with the Mediterranean countries began in the 1960s and involved ad hoc agreements with each Mediterranean country separately, mainly based on a preferential regime. Chronologically, the contractual relations between the European Union and Mediterranean countries could be classified into three historical periods:

A) 1961-1972, during this period the Mediterranean policy of the Community is characterized by a lack of cohesion. A characteristic of the period is the development of bilateral relations and the signing of association agreements. Specifically, Greece signed an association agreement with the EEC in 1961, Turkey in 1963, Israel in 1964, Lebanon in 1965, Morocco and Tunisia in 1969, Spain and Malta in 1971, Yugoslavia (non-preferential agreement) in 1971, and finally Cyprus, Egypt, and Portugal in 1972.

Essentially, within the framework of the initial EEC-Mediterranean countries approach, no significant economic benefits are recorded for the parties involved. This is mainly due to the protectionist policies that the Community exercised for its primarily agricultural products, a policy with negative consequences for the corresponding agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries. At the same time, however, the Mediterranean countries also failed to take advantage of the opportunities that arose from the agreements with the EEC, due to structural weaknesses and the limited competitiveness of their economies.

Β) 1972- 1985. The European Council adopts in Paris in October 1972 the Commission’s proposal for the exercise of a coordinated, systematic, and uniform Mediterranean policy. Later, in November 1972, the “Global Mediterranean Policy” of the EEC is adopted, which was inaugurated with the signing of an agreement with Israel in 1973. In 1976, the Community signed cooperation agreements with the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), and in January 1977 with the Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon). Finally, supplementary financial protocols were signed between the Community and Cyprus and Malta.

Overall, the Euro-Mediterranean Policy includes measures that enhance: a) economic and technical cooperation, b) assistance through financing protocols, c) trade arrangements concerning industrial and agricultural products, d) immigration policy arrangements, primarily concerning migrants from Maghreb countries. Additionally, within the framework of the EMP, the Euro-Arab dialogue was developed, a political tool that the Community created at the regional level to contribute to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

C) The New Mediterranean Policy 1985 – 1992.

It essentially constitutes a continuation of the Mediterranean Policy following the third enlargement of the Community, with the accession of Spain and Portugal. The aim of the Community was to safeguard the interests of both the new members and the TMCs (Third Mediterranean Countries), by shaping a new Mediterranean policy. The “new” Mediterranean policy adopted by the EU in April 1992 envisaged a gradual complete reduction in tariffs on agricultural products and the signing of third-generation financing protocols.

BARCELONA PROCESS

The Barcelona Conference on November 27-28, 1995, is a milestone in renewed Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, marking the beginning of a new period. With the Barcelona Declaration, the EU and its Mediterranean partners agree to cooperate to establish the Mediterranean as a trading zone that will guarantee the development, stability, and prosperity of its inhabitants. This is an ongoing process at the inter-regional level, where today the 27 EU members plus 10 Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey) participate. Libya has observer status since 1999.

The Barcelona Process, according to the Declaration, is characterized by two complementary dimensions: a) the bilateral dimension, where the EU, within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean process, develops bilateral cooperation relations with each Mediterranean country separately, and b) the regional dimension.

With the Barcelona Process, an overall approach to the problems of Mediterranean countries is attempted, and the way of financing is changing. The EU no longer funds states but programs and policies. The presence of the EU in the Mediterranean region is official and comprehensive. With the Barcelona Process, we are now talking about a partnership between the EU and Mediterranean countries.

The Barcelona Process revolves around three axes:

A) Cooperation in the fields of politics and security. The participants in the Conference recognize the need to create a zone of peace and security. This will be achieved through a political dialogue within the framework of the principles of international law. At the same time, they recognize the right to self-determination of peoples, always in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. They also undertake the obligation to respect the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other contracting parties and not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. They also agree to contribute to making the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical weapons.

B) Close collaboration on economic and financial matters, aimed at creating an area of economic prosperity. The cooperation includes three axes:

1. Creation of a free trade area by the year 2010. It was agreed to gradually eliminate tariff and non-tariff trade barriers for industrial products. Meanwhile, for the corresponding agricultural products, a gradual liberalization of trade was planned through the recognition of a preferential status.
2. Coordinated action within the framework of Economic cooperation. Both parties involved agreed that effective cooperation in the economic field should be preceded by coordination in administrative structures and structural adjustments.
3. Financial cooperation. With the Barcelona Process, the foundations for the development of a rational and upgraded financial cooperation were essentially laid. A significant innovation is the establishment of a new MEDA financing regulation, which replaces the older bilateral cooperation protocols. The MEDA programs are flexible and have targeted actions, based on bilateral cooperation and addressing each partner country separately according to its specific characteristics. The MEDA framework also includes “horizontal actions” to promote interregional cooperation.

C) Cooperation on a social, cultural, and humanitarian level. Emphasis is placed on the development of civil society through democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law. Particular emphasis is given to the development of human resources through education, cultural exchanges, and communication. It was also agreed to systematically and institutionally address immigration, corruption, drug trafficking, smuggling, crime, and terrorism.

In this context, euro-Mediterranean networks of collaboration or MED Programs are made available to partners for the promotion of civil society. Through the MED programs, funding that promotes cooperation at the interregional level between organizations and businesses is also strengthened. Indicatively, some of the most important programs: Med – Campus for the enhancement of cooperation between higher education institutions and educational organizations, Med – Media regarding the funding of cooperation in the field of Mass Media. Med – Invest for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises,, Med– Urs for cooperation between local government authorities, and Med – Migration, a program for the social integration of migrants in the host country.

In November 2004, the “Anna Lindh” Foundation was established, the first entity created from the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation by all 37 member states, with the mission of promoting the aims of the third pillar of Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation, namely the social and cultural dialogue between the citizens of the partner countries. Through dialogue, the Foundation aspires to ensure the defense of freedom of expression and the respect for human rights and the rule of law by the participating states.

Evaluation of the Euro-Mediterranean Process

Despite the commitments, approximately 14 years later, the results of Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation are considered meager to inadequate in all three pillars. Timidity, omissions, and inefficiency are attributed to both parties involved.

Α. In terms of political stability and security: both acknowledge the existence of serious problems. The majority of Third Mediterranean Countries are governed by precarious and weak political structures, incapable of implementing the political reforms deemed necessary for the democratization of their social frameworks. Furthermore, the relations between the TMCs are tense, and they often behave more like adversaries than potential partners, which increases the lack of cooperation. At the same time, the development of religious fundamentalism, the rise of crime and violence, reinforce the belief of many observers that these countries harbor terrorist extremist organizations.

A destabilizing factor in the broader region has been the Middle East for decades, with the ongoing torpedoing of the peace process. The Arab-Israeli conflict not only continues to exist but there also appears to be no likely solution on the immediate horizon. Unfortunately, the European Union has not managed to emerge as a significant factor in resolving the crisis. Its role is confined to wishing for a peaceful settlement and a return to normalcy, without being able to contribute decisively in that direction. This inability is reflected in the absence of a unified foreign policy and its operational dependence on NATO. Since 2001, the U.S. has undertaken several initiatives in the Middle East, while China’s exports to the region are also rapidly increasing. Nevertheless, it would be an omission not to mention the support provided by the Community for the reconstruction and economic recovery of the Palestinian Authority.

At a second level, the Community does not “feel” safe from the waves of impoverished migrants coming from the South of the Mediterranean, who enter its territory illegally. However, despite predictions for police and cross-border cooperation and generally cooperation on Justice issues, principles adopted through the Barcelona Process, policing remains inadequate and border protection is deficient. And of course, when the reforms for creating a viable economic environment have failed, how can one possibly prevent illegal immigration or the emergence of extreme extremist organizations?

Β. In the social, cultural, educational, and humanitarian field: The results of the collaboration are also mediocre. The implementation of the MED programs faced the skepticism and suspicion of the governments of the TMX. In particular, the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, lacking a democratic tradition, approached with particular reservation and showed strong resistance to the philosophy of the Med programs, which consists of encouraging broader participation of civil society and non-governmental organizations, without the prior approval or consent of national governments.

C. In the economic field, the difficulties are significant. The effort to create a free trade zone by the year 2010 is limited to mere wishes. The attempt to achieve the integration of the economies of the TMCs in a “negative” form, that is, through the removal of barriers and restrictions on transactions, is deemed inadequate. Additionally, the gradual abolition of customs duties on European products results in the loss of significant revenue for the TMCs, a development that is not viewed positively by the national governments of these countries, as it will have negative repercussions on their budgets. Furthermore, the majority of businesses in these countries are oriented towards the internal market and are subsidized with high state aids, a fact that will make them vulnerable to competition with the corresponding European businesses.

At the same time, the growth rate of the TMC continues to operate at low levels, due to the lack of appropriate structural changes, strained relationships, and low levels of cooperation and trade among the TMC. Indicatively, for the year 2002, this percentage was less than 15% of the total of their trade transactions. Moreover, the economic situation of these countries is aggravated by three political and social “deficits”: a) freedom deficit b) women’s rights and gender equality deficit c) education and access to knowledge deficit. The prospects for long-term economic growth and development are undermined by unsustainable management of the environment and natural resources (Regional Strategy Paper).

Barcelona Process and Greece

Greece had raised serious objections in the early 1990s regarding the proposed abolition of the payment of duties for all agricultural products included in the cooperation protocols until 1-1-1993. However, after intense pressure, it retreated. This decision was influenced by the realization that, in the end, any imports of agricultural products from the CEECs did not pose a threat to European and thus to Greek agricultural production. Furthermore, the elimination of duties had already been scheduled for 1/1/1996, so it was merely a matter of time. It should be noted that imports of agricultural products from the CEECs are limited, and a significant percentage of these do not operate competitively but complementarily, particularly in cases of fresh products that are imported into the Greek market during periods when there is no corresponding Greek production.

Greece expressed reservations regarding Turkey’s eligibility and its inclusion in the Community’s horizontal action program (MEDA), essentially requesting that funding be restricted exclusively to the countries of the Maghreb and Mashreq. Of course, there was serious dissent and reactions at the European level. In the end, the Greek delegation managed, under the threat that it would block the implementation of the renewed Mediterranean policy of the Community, to obtain a statement from Commissioner Matutes that the “horizontal action” programs would not be used as an indirect means of bilateral funding for Turkey. Ultimately, Greece was forced not to insist on its demands, but as a counterbalance, it secured a statement saying that the normalization and development of relations between the European Community and Turkey was directly linked to progress in resolving the Cyprus issue.

Problems and prospects of the Barcelona Process

Today, approximately 14 years after the signing of the Barcelona Declaration, the international scene has changed significantly. At the European level, in May 2004, the accession of 10 new states to the EU was signed, among them Cyprus and Malta, while the orientation of Greek foreign policy has also changed dramatically, lifting the restrictions aimed at excluding Turkey. Today, Greece appears as a supporter of Turkey’s candidature for accession to the Union. At the same time, however, at the international level, following the terrorist attack of September ¹¹, 2001, and the war in Iraq, the situation within the states located on the southern shore of the Mediterranean has taken a negative trajectory. The number of extremist organizations operating within the territory of these countries has increased sharply, while policing and suppression of them is minimal to nonexistent.

Under the pressure of the above circumstances, the European Union, having timely realized that the prospect of a fortress Europe that would keep away its poor neighbors is not a viable solution, is trying through consultations and high-level conferences to boost Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation. Specifically, since 1995, a series of conferences have taken place focused on promoting the Barcelona Process.

The European Union, along with the Neighborhood Policy adopted in December 2004, aims to establish a climate of stability and peace in the wider region. According to the conclusions of the conference in Luxembourg (May 2005), the solution of adopting a “roadmap” for the liberalization of trade in agricultural products and fisheries is promoted. Also, reforms that will strengthen interregional cooperation in rural areas are encouraged, laying the groundwork for sustainable economic development, increased investments, and the creation of new jobs. It was agreed that the reforms should extend to transport, energy, information technology, and new technologies.

Finally, the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly in March 2004 is considered significant for the democratization of the TMC and the strengthening of civil society. Since then, the Assembly of civil society has had a significant presence, culminating in its contribution to the shaping of the Final Declaration of Luxembourg in 2005, where among other things, it was decided to emphasize education, with the aim of promoting the rights of women and individuals living in poor and marginalized areas, with limited opportunities. The goal, by the year 2015, is the elimination of gender inequalities and illiteracy.

However, it should be noted that despite the continuous meetings, conferences, announcements, and the huge amounts of funding being spent on the economic and social development of the MENA countries, the situation in these countries continues to deteriorate. According to the World Bank’s 2007 report, growth and competitiveness in the Maghreb and Near East countries remain among the lowest in the world. Clearly, this is not solely due to omissions and mistakes of the MENA countries. Lack of decisiveness also characterizes the EU’s initiatives, which should support the MENA countries substantively if it desires peace and stability in its region.

SOURCES:

Barcelona Declaration, November 1995.

Euro – Meditterranneen,Synopsis Euromed, edition 226, 15 Mai 2003

European Commission, Evaluation of Economic Cooperation between EE and Mediterranean Countries, 1996

http://www.eliamep.gr, http://www.idis.gr , http://www.europa.eu

Ath. Theodorakis, The expansion of the European Union to the South, in “The New Perspectives of Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation,” Research and Documentation Texts No. 36, EKEM, Athens, 1995

E. Chr. Arampatzis Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations, Critique, Athens, 2003

Eleftheria Fyga, Critical assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean process (Barcelona process), University of Athens, Master’s thesis, 2005

ELIAMEP, DrIbrahimA. Hegazy, The Barcelona Process, 2008

Consolidated Treaty on European Union Treaties, Athens, 2003