THE EUROPEAN UNION: A MIXTURE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND SUPRANATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

THE EUROPEAN UNION: A MIXTURE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND SUPRANATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

THE DICHOTOMY IN THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY.

Anna Karamanou

(notes, within the framework of the Master’s Program of the Political Department of the Faculty of Law, University of Athens)

January 2005

INTRODUCTION

In more than 50 years of life and operation of the EU, European regional integration has evolved into a complex system without precedent in the history of the modern world. As Dimitris Chrysochoou writes, no other system has been attributed so many and such diverse neologisms: proto-federation, confederation, concordance system, quasi-state, mixed polity, Staatenverbund, consortio, condominio, regulatory state, market polity, managed Gesellschaft, multilevel republic, confederal consociation, mixed commonwealth, etc.

However, all these neologisms capture only a part of a much greater complexity. As a result, a reliable theory of European integration, which could form the basis for the future of the regional system, is still under investigation. At the same time, however, the study of the EU constitutes an exciting exercise for the evolution of theory, for the creation of new theory, and recently, for metatheory (Chrysochoou, 2000). Without a doubt, the EU constitutes a complex sui generis political system. This is why Kuhn is right when he argues that, since there is no theoretical model, all possibilities are open. In other words, the “elephant’s touch,” as presented by Puchala about 30 years ago, remains a very difficult task for theorists of European Integration.

In any case, within the framework of the EU’s multilevel governance, the intergovernmental and supranational elements are involved in a polymorphic structure that is maintained in the new Constitutional Treaty.

EUROPE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION

The intergovernmental approach is mainly represented by France and the United Kingdom, with the Scandinavian member states (Sweden, Denmark) as supporters. This trend argues in favor of strengthening intergovernmental institutions—those in which member states participate. Therefore, the answer to the central question “how will the future government of the enlarged Union be structured?” from these countries is that the Council and the European Council should have the central role in any future governance structure of the Union.

About two years ago, Blair and Aznar’s contribution to the debate on the Future of Europe was a joint statement that put forward a strategy for Europe completely different from that of institutional development. The two leaders proposed that the Union should limit its institutional reforms and focus its attention on reforming the economy. Spain, of course, has changed its position after the change in government. The new prime minister of the country advocates for a federal perspective for the Union. However, there are many other EU member states that support the position of the United Kingdom. These include Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria. Of course, we should not overlook the countries of the former Soviet bloc, which are now EU members.

According to the intergovernmental view, institutional reforms should be made with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of decision-making in the Union. Although the “intergovernmentalists” give considerable importance to the role of the Commission, they believe that the final say on vital decisions affecting the member states should be taken by the European Council, while the Commission and the Parliament are of secondary importance. They argue that the EU Foreign Minister should be linked to the Council, not the Commission, and that the key to decision-making responsibility in the Union lies in the relationship between the member states of the Council and their national parliaments. Therefore, they place great importance on the role of national parliaments, as well as the application of the principle of subsidiarity. In short, the “intergovernmentalists” believe that Europe should be a free zone for trade and economic cooperation, where national states dominate, and under no circumstances should there be talk of a federal perspective for the EU.

In general, these member states show clear opposition to proposals for strengthening the role of supranational institutions, particularly the European Commission and the European Parliament. To enhance the democratic character of the Union, these countries (United Kingdom, France) propose the creation of a second legislative body composed of representatives from national parliaments.

THE SUPRANATIONAL APPROACH

The supranational approach is primarily expressed by Germany and the smaller EU member states. There are some variations within this approach. Germany, for example, more strongly advocates the idea of a European federation of member states. The smaller member states (including Greece), as well as the Union’s institutions (the Commission, Parliament), emphasize the need to preserve the “community model” and the “community method of integration” as the basis for the further development of the European Union. The proposal to respect the “community model” practically entails, among other things:

a) Strengthening the role of the European Commission (particularly the right of legislative initiative) and elevating it as the central governing body.

b) Gradual merger of the three pillars of the Union into a single community pillar (the first pillar).

c) Rejection of ideas for the establishment of a second legislative body, to be composed of representatives of national parliaments.

d) Strengthening the role of the European Parliament and (by certain countries) the transformation of the Council into a second legislative body.

e) Legitimization of the EU through electoral processes (e.g., election of the President of the Commission).

THE SUPRANATIONAL APPROACH ENRICHED WITH FEDERAL ELEMENTS

THE FEDERATION OF NATIONAL STATES

The first European politician to speak about the federalization of the EU was J. Delors, former President of the European Commission, according to whom the Union’s slide into a free trade zone could only be avoided if a vanguard of member states proceeded with the “transformation of the European Community into a Political Union.” According to him, this vanguard could initially consist of the six founding member states of the Community, with the possibility of other countries joining, provided they were willing and able to cooperate in the Political Union. The institutional model of this Union would have the character of a “federation of national states.”

On the other hand, the President of France, J. Chirac, prefers the model of a “Intergovernmental Federation” for the Union, where the European Commission would play a central role. Two other important French politicians, Chirac and Jospin, follow the same line. Specifically, the latter believes that “Europe is an original political formation with two inseparable elements: the federal idea and the reality of European nation-states.” Therefore, he also adopts Delors’ idea of a “federation of national states.”

Although Jospin withdrew from the political scene in 2002, his ideas seem to still resonate in France more broadly (Chirac, Villepin, Raffarin). The same position appears to be shared by other EU member states. Notably, the cases of Finland and Portugal are worth mentioning. Finland supports the need to strengthen the Union’s institutions, while also emphasizing the importance of equality among nation-states. Portugal, on the other hand, seems to be wavering between the federal and confederal ideas.

The general logic of this position is the strengthening of the Commission’s role, a greater and more dynamic representation of the Union at the international level, the confirmation of the European Council as the dominant institution of the Union with a permanent Council of Ministers, further legitimization of the European Parliament, and the enhancement of the role of national parliaments with the potential establishment of a European Congress. In short, the view prevails that in a federation of nation-states, democratic legitimacy will be ensured through a complex system of checks and balances, rather than through a simple hierarchical chain.

THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION

The dichotomy between intergovernmental and supranational characteristics is maintained in the European Constitution and is, of course, due to the different approaches and interests of the member states. The constitution is a product of compromise and reflects the dynamics of the specific time period. However, at least ten provisions certify the federal and supranational character of the EU. Specifically:

1. Granting the Union a single legal personality. Until now, the European Community had legal personality, but not the European Union. With the Constitution, the European Community is abolished, along with the Union’s structure in pillars. The Union becomes a single entity with a single legal personality. This development will have significant beneficial consequences for the Union’s international presence and role, as it will have the (legal) capacity to conclude agreements in all areas (economic and political). Theoretically, it could even become a member of the UN Security Council. Overall, the recognition of legal personality for the Union enhances its international role and presence as a unified quasi-state entity.

2. Inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution. The Charter of Fundamental Rights, adopted in 2000 by the Union, represented a significant qualitative development. However, it remained a political declaration and nothing more until now. With the Constitution, the Charter gains legally binding status (as the second part of the Constitution). The legal, political, and constitutional implications of transforming the Charter from a political declaration into a (legally) binding document are obvious for the political and institutional structure of the Union, as well as for strengthening the Union’s social identity.

3. Strengthening the democratic character of the Union. The Constitution significantly contributes to strengthening the democratic character of the European Union through a set of provisions such as: the institutionalization of the principles of representative and participatory democracy, the recognition of the right of European citizens to initiate legislation (at least 1,000,000 citizens from a significant number of member states can request the European Commission to propose legislative measures), the extension of qualified majority voting, the strengthening of the role of national parliaments, and more. The Constitution also enshrines the principle of “subsidiarity.” Regardless of any interpretations, the principle of subsidiarity is an integral part of the federal structure of political systems (e.g., see the German Constitution, etc.). The Constitution “entrenches” this principle while simultaneously recognizing that the Union operates based on the “community model” of integration.

4. Expansion of qualified majority voting. With the Constitution, qualified majority voting is significantly expanded (although not to a satisfactory degree) as a decision-making tool in the Council of the Union. At the same time (since 2009), the method for forming a qualified majority is radically changed. The Union moves from the complex system of vote allocation to the “double majority” system — a majority of states (55%) and a majority of the population (65%) for decision-making. This is a more democratic system, but also one of a federal logic, especially with its direct reference to the population of the Union it encompasses.
10. The drafting of the Constitution. Finally, a decisive element of the federal logic should be considered the fact that a Constitution has been drafted for the Union. In this way, the “Union of Treaties” gives way to the “Union of the Constitution.” The political and symbolic significance of this development is unquestionable. The concept of a Constitution refers to a state entity with democratic structure and functioning. The Constitution serves as the means for the birth of a federation (e.g., the USA, Canada, etc.).

Certainly, the Constitution contains elements and provisions that someone could use to argue in favor of the intergovernmental approach. Such elements include, for example, the appointment of a permanent President of the European Council, the reform of the rotating presidency in the Council of Ministers, and others. However, these reforms are necessary as a prerequisite for enhancing the effectiveness, functioning, and policy-making processes in the enlarged European Union.

The Constitution could more rightly be criticized for some serious “gaps” in at least three areas: (a) common foreign policy and defense, (b) economic governance (macroeconomic policy, management, euro representation), and (c) social policy. In these areas, the provisions could have been set at a higher standard to form a new “political agenda” for the enlarged European Union.

Supranational characteristics:

Judicial system: The supremacy of law is a key element of the EU. The Court has ensured the primacy of Community law over national law. The result is a shift from a sovereign relationship to a legal relationship between the member states.
European Parliament: There must be a House of Representatives and a House of States. The EP has come halfway regarding the House of Representatives. It must have full control over the budget and legislation and should not be restricted. It must be made clear that it is the primary democratic and representative body of the people.
Commission: It has managed to show that it can function as a government in the area of competition. It must be given full governmental characteristics and be accountable to the Council and the Parliament.
European Central Bank: Following the model of a federal state. Executive committee – 6 members + administrative staff (the 6 are appointed by the governments). Decisions are voted on. They are not disclosed. It is not accountable. The minutes are not published. The voting system will change. A federal institutional body. General economic policy. A significant portion of sovereignty is delegated.
EMU: The EMU is the most important decision ever made in Europe for the following reasons: 1. Economic reasons: the abolition of autonomy and sovereignty of states in the monetary domain. Economic consequences: The abolition of exchange rates means the removal of trade barriers. Exchange rates are the largest trade barrier. Why? a) The exchange rate is the most important price. b) Uncertainty. When you operate with a single currency, you don’t face exchange rate risk. When you invest, you are not concerned about exchange rates or prices. Impact on exchange rates and capital market prices. The EMU will have significant long-term impacts. Economic integration. 2. Politically significant. 3. Morally significant: Currency is one of the symbols of a state. A significant concession. A huge economic-political step + it expressed a specific prevailing thought. It reflects political balances and prevailing economic ideas. The prevailing views are not a given. They are not realpolitik. Nor idealistic.

Intergovernmental characteristics:

Council: Upper House. House of States. It has executive powers beyond legislative ones, without being accountable to any institution. This goes far beyond liberal democracy.
European Council: A purely intergovernmental institution that should be integrated into the Council + Parliament.
Common Foreign Policy
Common Defense
Taxation: Since the Rome Treaty, there has been a desire for the harmonization of taxation at the European level. The main achievement is the adoption of a unified value-added tax (VAT) system for the avoidance of distortions in cross-border trade. However, this has not been accompanied by the harmonization of the tax base and tax rates. There are differences in VAT rates. However, no serious distortions are caused because goods are taxed at the place of consumption, and adjustments are made at the borders, due to the single internal market and the abolition of all border checks.
Therefore: equal competitive conditions. The harmonization of corporate taxation is minimal. Reasons: 1. Very different systems in the Member States. 2. Unanimity of the Council is required on tax matters.

Other critical issues: CFSP, military, peacekeeping forces, NATO, CAP reform, relations with the USA, ESDP. The issue of the United Kingdom, an isolated partner.

Although the status of a superpower is still a distant vision, the EU could play a role in strengthening international institutions and in shaping a multipolar system based more on the existence of rules and the concept of justice rather than on military power.

CONCLUSION

The theoretical question raised by Etzioni is whether the semi-supranationalism characterizing the EU is sufficient to address its challenges, and whether such a level of integration can be sustainable. The question the EU faces today is whether it is possible to almost completely supranationalize several important institutions (particularly those linked to the free movement of goods and services, capital, and employment) while simultaneously keeping political integration at a low level.

It is certain that the system cannot function without strong political institutions and a commonly accepted system of values. Ultimately, Etzioni concludes that semi-supranationalism cannot be sustainable and that the EU must move either towards a higher level of supranationalism or return to lower levels.