The Kemalist modernization of Turkey and its impact on the status of women

UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

SCHOOL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Master’s Program: “European and International Studies”

DIPLOMA WORK

Anna Karamanou

SUPERVISING PROFESSOR

Thanos Veremis

“THE KEMALIST MODERNIZATION

THE INFLUENCE OF TURKEY AND ITS IMPACT

AT THE PLACE OF WOMEN”

JUNE 2006

CONTENTS.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Definition of Kemalist Modernization: from tradition to modernity

1.2. Το θεωρητικό πλαίσιο

1.3. Μεθοδολογία

2. THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT OF MODERNIZATION – WOMEN, SECULAR STATE & ISLAM

2.1. Οι προπομποί των μεταρρυθμίσεων

2.2. Κοσμικό κράτος Vs theocracy

2.3. Κεμαλικό Κράτος και δικαιώματα των γυναικών

2.4. Η γυναίκα πολίτης και οι «ιεροί ηθικοί κανόνες»

2.5. Κρατικός φεμινισμός και παραδοσιακή πατριαρχία

2.6 The reproduction of discrimination in education and work

3. ISLAM AND GENDER EQUALITY

3.1. «Οι γυναίκες προκαλούν αναταραχή…»

3.2. Η κατάργηση του φερετζέ και η μάχη για τη μαντήλα

3.3. Η συστημική βία κατά των γυναικών, τα εγκλήματα «τιμής» και ο παράδεισος με τις παρθένες

4. WOMEN AND THE SOCIETY OF CITIZENS

4.1. Η ανάπτυξη του φεμινιστικού κινήματος και η συμμετοχή στους δημοκρατικούς θεσμούς

5. THE EUROPEAN DREAM OF TURKEY

5.1. Η προοπτική ένταξης στην ΕΕ

5.2. Το ευρωπαϊκό κεκτημένο για την ισότητα των φύλων και πως γεφυρώνεται το χάσμα ΕΕ-Τουρκίας

6. CONCLUSIONS

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

“In some places I have seen women who put a cloth to cover their faces and turn their backs or fall to the ground when a man passes by. What is the meaning and logic of this behavior? Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation adopt such a strange attitude, such a barbaric habit? It is a spectacle that ridicules the nation. It must stop immediately.” (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Antipolis, 30.08.1925)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Definition of Kemalist Modernization: from tradition to modernity

The modernization promoted in the newly established Turkish state, in the early ^20th century, by its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, has been interpreted by many as a cultural revolution that led the country from the Ottoman-Islamic reality to the modern Turkish, Western-style, Republic. A lover of the European way of life and inspired by Western European thought and the French Revolution, Kemal identified the modernization of the state with Westernization, which became one of the most important pillars of the Kemalist doctrine upon which modern Turkey was founded. Atatürk believed that the main cause of the delay in Turkish society was religion, which constituted the official ideology of the Ottoman state and was condensed in the simplistic message: follow the Prophet and his commandments and everything will be fine… For their part, apologists of Islam argue that their religion is not opposed to rationalism. However, the analysis of the evidence shows that official Ottoman Islam delayed the acceptance of new knowledge based on the power of reason. As many Turkish intellectuals argue, Turkey missed the Renaissance period (Mango, 1999, p. 5). In any case, the official ideology of the state presented obstacles to any innovation. The conservatism, of course, was not limited only to state theory but also to medicine, astronomy, geography, and other fields of medieval science that survived in the Ottoman state many years after being abandoned by Western Europe. However, ultimately, despite the delay, the dissemination of new knowledge was not halted, and Kemal made the most of it. As his first concern and goal, he set the secularization of his 99% Muslim country, eliminating the theocratic power of the Islamic Caliphate and abolishing the use of Arabic script, that is, the language and script of the Quran. Kemal’s rise to leadership of the Turkish nation brought about unprecedented upheavals for that time, establishing Atatürk as the greatest modernizer and “nation builder” of all time (ibid.). Certainly, in Kemal’s revolutionary reforms, there are elements of originality and ingenuity, if one places them in the historical and social context of the time. Women’s rights, among other changes, became a key objective of Kemalist modernization. The fact that a patriarchal, male-dominated state elevated women’s rights to national policy for public life constituted a reversal that had never occurred in the history of humanity. Perhaps this alone explains the great reactions and resistances he encountered from the Islamic patriarchal establishment.

1.2. το θεωρητικό πλαίσιο

The following analysis will attempt to demonstrate that Kemal’s reforms validate the theory of modernization, to the definition and concept of which both classical and contemporary theorists attribute nothing more than a reform program that leads an outdated framework – social, political, economic – to modern reality. For many analysts, Kemalist modernization, with the emphasis it placed on nationalism, solidarity, and republicanism, constitutes the Turkish equivalent of the French Revolution (Mardin, 1971). The theory of modernization, which developed mainly in the mid-^20th century with significant representatives like Walter W. Rostow, Daniel Lerner, Samuel Huntington, and others, examines and analyzes mainly the modernization of the state and argues that economic development encourages political development, urbanization, the creation of the middle class, and the eradication of traditional systems.

The theory of secularization, which dominated the analysis of the relationship between politics and religion throughout the ^20th century, will be very useful for our analysis. This theory argued that the secularization of modern societies would shape modern states, which would be indifferent to religion. However, the revival of religions at the end of the ^20th century and the victories of political Islam contradicted these predictions. In Turkey, the modernization of the state did not lead to secularization, in the sense of the loss of faith or the individualization of religion (Stark and Finke 2000, in Kuru 2004). Recently, the theory of rational choice (Rational Choice Theory) has attempted to become the dominant approach in the analysis of religion and politics. Rodney Stark and others argue that where there is state intervention in religion, there is a decline in religious participation, citing France as an example. However, in the case of Turkey, the theory fails to explain how the significant state intervention in religion did not result in the decline of religion in society.

Westernization, which is of greater interest to the present work, concerns the process that leads traditional societies under the influence of Western culture in areas such as politics and economics, technology, industry, laws, lifestyle and clothing, dietary habits, language and alphabet, religion, and values. Westernization has been a very strong current on a global scale during the last few centuries, particularly from the ^17th century onwards. Initially, the Young Ottomans of the ^19th century joined this current, and in the early 20th century, the Young Turks and their later leader Mustafa Kemal followed. Finally, feminist theories (liberal, Marxist, socialist, social democratic, radical, critical, postmodern) will be utilized in the context of the analysis that follows.

1.3. Μεθοδολογία

In the context of this analysis, regarding the case study of the modernization of Turkey, the following questions will be addressed: a/ How is the framework of reforms concerning the position of women in the newly established state defined? b/ How did the reforms impact the evolution of women’s rights in the public and private spheres and in their relationship with the state and Islam? c/ Did the changes lead to the empowerment and social liberation of women, gender equality, and Europeanization? The main working hypothesis is that Kemalist modernization and “top-down” empowerment created conditions and opportunities for enhancing the position of women, but did not lead to their liberation, respect for their human rights, and substantive gender equality.

Based on the above questions and the working hypothesis, the analytical framework and structure of this paper is shaped as follows: in section 2, I will examine the historical context of the reforms and the relationship that developed between women and the new secular state; in section 3, the confrontation of modernization with Islam, the struggle for identity, the position of women in the public and private spheres, the role of culture, and the responsibility of Islam for the violations of women’s rights; in section 4, the development of the feminist movement in Turkey and the new relationship of women with civil society and democratic institutions; in section 5, Turkey’s European perspective and the adoption of the European acquis on gender equality within the framework of the pre-accession process; and in section 6, the main conclusions.

The bibliographic sources and research tools used for the topic under examination are primarily academic studies and research on the life and work of Atatürk, articles on the status and rights of women during the three critical periods (Young Ottomans – ^19th century, Young Turks – Kemal, and the last 25 “European” years), the Quran, as well as reports from the European Commission, the European Parliament, Amnesty International, and press publications. However, it should be noted that the impact of Atatürk’s policies on women’s lives and rights has not received the attention that other reforms have garnered from contemporary scholars and political analysts. Certainly, this can only be part of the broader enduring undervaluation of women’s roles by international literature and the patriarchal reaction against any efforts that may lead to gender equality.

2. THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT OF MODERNIZATION – WOMEN, SECULAR STATE & ISLAM

2.1. Οι προπομποί των μεταρρυθμίσεων

The forerunners of the reforms were the Young Ottomans, the bureaucrats who emerged from the Tanzimat reforms and who were inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution. This new “social class,” advocates of a centralized state, had become dominant in the power structure of the empire during the ^19th century. Their families had begun to Europeanize long before the establishment of the Republic and had developed an urban lifestyle, with nuclear families and Western ways of managing household economics, decoration, nutrition, hygiene, clothing, and child-rearing (Athanasiopoulou, lecture, 2005). As the empire declined, this trend was strengthened when people of various nationalities and religions from across the former empire began to arrive in the cities, particularly in Constantinople, bringing with them new ideas, new ways of life, and new perceptions of marriage, relationships, family planning, and pedagogy. These Europeanized bourgeois created the ideological foundation for changes and were the precursors of Kemalist modernization. From 1839 to 1876, major reforms (Tanzimat reforms) were promoted in public administration, legislation, and education. The issue of women’s emancipation was one of the hottest topics of public discourse and contention between the “progressives” and conservative Islamists, as will be analyzed below.

The women (wives) of the Young Ottomans were watching the developments in Europe, publishing pamphlets, being educated at the Women’s University founded in 1915, and raising issues about women’s legal rights, while they even took political initiatives. Margaret Macmillan, in her book “The Peacemakers” (2001, p. 444), writes about the political initiative of a delegation of women in Constantinople to the British High Commissioner, after the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks in 1919: “a piece has been cut off,” said the leader, “from the living body of the Ottoman Empire of which it was a part and is now bleeding…”. In the palace, the Sultan and his ministers were also ready to send a protest to the British. However, Mustafa Kemal had a different view on the matter. He called for action and not protests. The re-occupation of Smyrna under his leadership was crucial for his political future, but also for the evolution of modern Turkey.

The study of the literature (Lewis, Mango, Poulton, Tekeli, Veremis, Anagnostopoulou et al.) demonstrates that the changes promoted by Kemal, as the head of the state, cannot be attributed solely to external European influences, but also to the economic, political, and social changes that took place during the ^19th century and affected the declining Ottoman Empire. These processes, after the end of World War I and the dissolution of the empire, under Kemal’s leadership, led to the modern Turkish state, simultaneously opening a new chapter and a new world for women. The recognition of women’s social and political rights emerged not as a result of mass feminist demands, but rather from above, as a form of state feminism, as many argue, forming the backbone of Turkish modernization. The preceding analysis shows that a large portion of women was already prepared to gladly accept changes that enhanced their social and political role. According to recent research that uncovers unknown manuscripts and biographical details about Atatürk’s family life, his wife Latife Ussaki played a decisive role in shaping Kemal’s vision for modern Turkey and exerted significant pressure for the promotion of women’s rights, which were recognized well before France and Switzerland (Economist, June 24-30, 2006). Therefore, even at the level of a privileged elite, the background for the changes had already been established.

2.2. Κοσμικό κράτος Vs theocracy

On March ¹, 1924, Kemal emphasized in a speech to the Parliament the need to create a unified national education system and “purification and elevation of the Islamic faith, rescuing it from the position of a political instrument with which it had been identified for centuries.” The next day, the sultanate was abolished along with the caliphate, all members of the Ottoman royal family were removed from Turkish territory, and religious institutions, activities, and foundations were placed under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. By abolishing the caliphate, Kemal launched the first overt attack against the entrenched powers of Islamic orthodoxy (Lewis, 1961, p. 521-22).

The traditional Islamic state was theoretically, but also in popular perception, a theocracy, where God was the only legitimate source of power and law, and the monarch was His earthly representative. Faith was the official symbol of the established political and social order. The same sacred law, which came from the same source and was enforced by the same system of justice, included civil, criminal, and constitutional law. The abolition of the caliphate dealt a crushing blow to the entire system, as it was accompanied by a series of other measures that abolished the Ministry of Seriat, closed the separate religious schools and religious colleges, as well as the special Seriat courts, where theologian-judges administered the sacred law. The new order was confirmed in the democratic constitution approved by the Great National Assembly on April 20, 1924.

When Kemal was promoting these revolutionary changes, he certainly could not have imagined that after his death 40,000 mosques would be built in Turkey, at a time when the country needed schools to educate its citizens. According to Muammer Kaylan, (2005, p. 21) Kemal’s successors paved the way for the revival of Islam.

2.3. Κεμαλικό Κράτος και δικαιώματα των γυναικών

The abolition of the sacred Islamic law Sharia and its replacement in 1926 with the Swiss Civil Code, the establishment of mixed education for boys and girls, the abolition of the headscarf, the right to vote and to be elected guaranteed the public presence of women. Polygamy and religious marriage were abolished, child marriages were prohibited, and women could request divorce. With all these changes promoted by the Kemalist regime, it was expected that women would become the carriers of modernization, the heralds of the secular state, and the protagonists in the public sphere, at least among the elite. The new government made radical changes in legislation, encouraged women to enter universities, gain professional qualifications, and run for public office (Gölle, 2004). However, we find that these overwhelming changes did not eliminate gender discrimination, nor the privileges of men, nor the traditional submission of women to the male gender, since even with the new family code, men officially remained the heads of the family and women needed their permission to work or travel. The man also decided on the place of residence and was the main responsible guardian of the children. As a result of all this favoritism towards men, the new code remained practically inactive regarding its innovative elements (Kabasakal-Arat, 2003).

The penal code, which was also established in 1926, following the Italian model, included articles that discriminated based on gender (articles 440-444), defining adultery differently for men and women and limiting women’s reproductive rights. Similarly, labor laws restricted women’s employment opportunities and their access to better-paying positions by designating certain jobs as dangerous for women (Zeytinoglu, 1994). Consequently, all these laws combined created a legal framework that maintained the division of labor by gender and women’s dependence on men, socially and economically. All these factors raise the reasonable question: Did the lives of women change in any way, did their social and economic status improve? In response to these questions, we will attempt to examine in depth the changes that occurred and evaluate their outcomes.

2.4. η γυναίκα πολίτης και οι «ιεροί ηθικοί κανόνες»

In 1930, women were recognized with the right to vote in local elections, and the first 13 women judges were appointed. In 1934, women were granted full political rights, and in 1935, 18 women were elected to the Grand National Assembly of its 395 members (DGSPW, 1999). The recognition of women’s political rights was the greatest change of the Kemalist regime, at a time when many advanced Western countries had not yet recognized the right to vote and to be elected for women. The number of women politicians, of course, significantly decreased after the death of Kemal and particularly after the first multi-party elections of 1950, when the number of women members of Parliament fell to three. This reflects the reaction that occurred against the emancipation of women and the desire to return to absolute patriarchy. Kemal’s endeavor was certainly bolder than what traditional Islamic society could assimilate, despite the fact that the significant changes mostly concerned the public rather than the private sphere. For the new secular state, the ideal woman became the “citizen woman,” the educated and socially progressive bourgeois, who, however, was simultaneously a perfect housewife. The ideal, therefore, for the modernizers of the time was essentially the “super-woman,” one who could combine traditional roles with modern ones and social emancipation.

The “modern,” as defined by the Turkish state, included family and children as the national duty of women. This leads us to the thought that the Aristotelian theory of the two spheres – the public belonging to men and the private to women – was not overturned, at least in the second aspect, by Kemalist modernization, and thus neither was the control of female sexuality, which primarily concerned the male Islamic establishment. The regime’s interest was focused on not harming, even in the slightest, family values, patriarchal structures, and of course, male privileges. Atatürk, while believing that religion is a matter of personal choice and does not concern the public sphere, simultaneously believed that “the rules of morality are sacred.” Through the same speech, in 1923, he called on women “to take their rightful place in the economic life of the country” while declaring that “the highest duty of women is motherhood” (Duber & Behar 1991, in White’s Report). These ideas were not even challenged by the pioneering women of the time. Even the women’s magazines wrote about the need for women to be educated, so that they could fulfill their political duty better, that is, to raise the nation’s offspring correctly. This attitude resulted in a delay in the development of an authentic and assertive feminist movement in Turkey, as we will see below.

As Bernard Lewis, Deniz Kandiyoti, Jenny White, Margaret McMillan, and Yesim Arat write, Democracy was clearly concerned with the public emancipation of women and not with what was happening in the private sphere, behind closed doors. Therefore, we conclude, the issue of domestic violence, abuse, rape, forced marriages, honor crimes, and the individual rights of women was not on the political agenda of Kemalist modernization, which is why the “tradition,” in terms of the private sphere and family values, remained unchanged. Of course, this does not mean that the changes made in other areas, particularly the secularization of the state, did not have some effect, even if limited, on the private sphere.

2.5. κρατικός φεμινισμός και παραδοσιακή πατριαρχία

As we have already established, state feminism was primarily concerned with the public emancipation of women and was indifferent to their private lives. The reinforcement of these views was also contributed to by the theorists of the time, among whom the most prominent was Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), an intellectual of Kurdish descent, nationalist, theorist of pan-Turkism, who had a significant influence on Kemal and sought to find solutions and balances between the secular state and Islam. He argued that modernization did not mean westernization, but rather something particularly Turkish (Tacettin 1993, White). According to this perception, therefore, the Republic did not need to look towards the West, with its dangerous tendencies of romanticism and individualism, for a model of equality, but could look towards its own semi-mythical past, in pre-Islamic Turkish Central Asia, that is, to its historical roots. Gökalp maintained that pre-Islamic Turkish society was naturally a society of equality and that the ancient Turks were both democrats and feminists. In other words, Turks had no need to imitate Europeans, as they could draw from their past. His main goal was for the modernization of the country not to lead to the loss or distortion of the essence of Turkish culture. However, Kemal’s anti-Islamic stance tipped the balance in favor of westernization (Mardin 1971). Gökalp’s ideas, fundamentally nationalist, led to the difficult coexistence of modernization with patriarchy and of Kemalism with political Islam, resulting in harsh conflicts and rivalries that continue to manifest today. It is no coincidence that he is the favorite poet of the current Prime Minister of Turkey, for whom he went to prison when, as mayor of Istanbul (2000), he recited one of his poems at a public gathering, which was deemed to be in opposition to the values of Kemalism.

Göle certainly argues (and perhaps others as well) that women shaped the public sphere in Turkey within the framework of a modern Islam, in contrast to the West, where the public sphere was initially shaped by male bourgeois individuals, who excluded the working class and women. However, we believe that this viewpoint is in complete contradiction, both with the core of Kemalist reform and the sanctification of the “mother-woman,” as well as with the limited participation of women in the public sphere and political decision-making processes up to the present day. The public sphere formally, and with the law, certainly opened its gates to women; however, in reality, women’s entry was hindered by social stereotypes, Islamic culture, and deeply rooted patriarchal beliefs, which are most fully expressed in the private sphere. Therefore, the restriction of women’s emancipation in the public sphere created the model of the dynamic Republican woman, who was, by definition, bourgeois and represented the modern, secular, Western-style state. Thus, she was obliged to behave and dress according to what the state considered a modern Western way. However, since only 20% of the population lived in cities, the number of women who could follow the new model was very limited. Women who felt that their religious beliefs imposed a specific dress code and those who remained attached to old customs were not accepted and were sometimes viewed as either uncivilized and primitive or as genteel peasants. As White (2003) argues, since poverty and rural origins did not allow women to leave their homes and educate themselves to contribute to professional life, social classes and the differences between the urban and rural worlds from the outset demonstrated the differentiation and rivalry between the two female models. This analysis of the two opposing female models helps us understand the differences and the modern competition between the center and the periphery that persist, differences that the current ruling Islamic party AKP has appropriately exploited (Athanassopoulou, 2005). Of course, Atatürk was aware of the contradictions; however, the possibilities of the Republic were too limited to convey his message to the remote mountainous and rural areas of Turkey. Despite the difficulties, however, the central government in Ankara sent newly trained teachers to the region, among whom were many women, to inform and transmit the new Republican standards to the rural population (White, 2003).

2.6 the reproduction of discrimination in education and employment

As we saw, Kemalist modernization encouraged women to educate themselves and enter universities, to acquire knowledge and qualifications, in order to contribute to the economic and social development of the country. Education and knowledge became the flag of Kemalist modernization. The principle of free mixed education was adopted for all levels, and primary education became the right and obligation of all. In 1929, 75% of girls aged 7 to 11 in Istanbul attended primary school, along with the same percentage of boys, compared to 26% of girls and 51% of boys nationwide. (Duben and Behar, 1991, in White Report). Between 1920 and 1938, 10% of university graduates were women, a significant percentage by the standards of that time. During the academic year 1931-32, in less than ten years, the Republic increased the total number of students by 400%, with the greatest progress recorded among women.

While all these policy measures provided great opportunities for women, the assessment made today, 83 years after the founding of the Turkish state, regarding the progress of women in education, the economy, and politics, shows that women lag behind men in all areas. One rightly wonders what happened and where that dynamic, which was created in the early years of the reforms, was lost along the way. Could it be that what intervened interrupted the progress of women that had begun with such momentum and promising prospects? In trying to answer the reasonable questions that arise, sociologist Kabasakal Arat conducted research among the older generation of the first educated women in 1992, perhaps seeking to find some responsibility among women for the reproduction of stereotypes and the passive acceptance of discrimination. Indeed, those women (aged 62 to 90) describe an educational system that imposed strict rules and special lessons for girls, while at the same time idealizing it; they express pride in having been children of Atatürk and deny that there were any gender-based discriminations. It is likely that they passed by without perceiving them, at least until the 1980s when the first women’s organizations began to form.

The reproduction of gender discrimination and its transmission to future generations should be sought in the structure and functioning of the educational system, which prioritized the education of men and promoted traditional gender roles in school curricula and vocational training. Subjects were categorized as “male” or “female” and were taught separately even in mixed schools. The entire system was therefore structured to provide women with an education useful for becoming good mothers and wives. Based on this functioning of the system, it is not surprising that traditional values survived the reforms of Kemal and are actually gaining more and more influence today with the revival of religiosity and the electoral victory of political Islam in Turkey.

Education is known to be connected with the labor market. Today, the percentage of women in the workforce in Turkey is the lowest in Europe, accompanied by high illiteracy rates and low-quality education. One in eight girls is out of school, often pressured to marry at a very young age (BBC NEWS, 23.09.2004). 73% of professions are dominated by men, while women are limited to a small number of “female” occupations. This division of professions and educational programs is evident at all levels, even in universities (Blagojevich, 2003). According to UN data from 2001, only 35-40% of women in Southeastern Turkey are literate compared to 75-80% of men. For the same area, the research showed that 16.3% of young women were married by the age of 15, and 1 in 10 lived in polygamous families, despite the fact that polygamy and Sharia have been abolished since 1926.

What is striking, however, is what the European Parliament reveals, that after 1998 there has been a decline in the participation of women in the labor force of the country, at a time when women in Turkey account for 30% of academics, doctors, and lawyers. According to studies by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, only 27% of women in Turkey are currently participating in the labor market, whereas in 1998 it was at 35% (Opinion Bozgurt, 25.6.2005). This fact can be partly explained by the movement from rural to urban areas and the participation of women in the so-called informal sector of the economy, but the rapporteur of the European Parliament believes that this happens due to the ongoing negative attitude of public opinion towards working women.

This negative attitude towards modernization is also expressed by the conservative stance towards the clothing of female public employees, where pants are prohibited. On December 7, 2001, female public servants in Turkey were called by their union to go to work wearing pants, as a sign of protest against a legislative regulation from 1982, which prohibits women working in the public sector from wearing pants at their workplace. The protest had a huge impact on women, while problems arose in Izmir, where directors banned the entry of women into their offices. The incident was denounced by the European Parliament, and the responsible Commissioner Mr. Verheugen, in his response (Karamanos question, 4.2.2002), mentions that the issue also concerned the Turkish Parliament, in a relevant act published on 3.1.2002.

After all this, one justifiably wonders what happened to the Kemalist model of the emancipated woman, what happened to Atatürk’s adopted daughter Sabiha Gökçen (Arat, 1997, 99), who, with his encouragement, became the first female fighter pilot, and her photograph in uniform, among male officials, combined and symbolized female emancipation and the Turkish secular state, with women on the front line.

3. ISLAM AND GENDER EQUALITY

3.1. «Οι γυναίκες προκαλούν αναταραχή…»

The Prophet shortly before his death had warned “After my departure, the great danger to my people will come from women. They cause unrest and are responsible for corruption and degeneration.” Men, therefore, must counter the threat by forcing women to cover their bodies and stay locked in their homes (Chalazias, 2001, p. 48). Generally, all religions, but especially Islam, express misogynistic views, which undoubtedly influence the formation of culture and the rights of women. Islam claims that gender inequality is the command of God, expressed through the sacred texts of the Prophet. In most Islamic countries, with very few exceptions, the instructions of the Quran, against women, have been incorporated into legislation – in family law, civil and criminal law, labor law, etc. – and have deprived millions of women of fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. The Quran itself, that is, God through the Prophet, asserts the superiority of men and their right to beat disobedient wives (chapter 4, verse 34):

“Men are superior to women because of the particular way in which God has elevated them above women, furthermore, because men give a dowry to women from their own wealth. The virtuous women are faithful and obedient and carefully guard, in the absence of their husbands, what God has commanded them to keep intact. Those whose disobedience you fear, reprimand them, distance them from your bed, and beat them. But if they are obedient, be kind to them. The Lord is the Most High and Great.”

It is evident the influence that Islam has exerted and its responsibility for the violence against women that often reaches crime, always in the name of tradition and the “honor” of the man. In another part of the Quran, where issues of inheritance law are regulated, explicitly the value of a woman is assessed at half that of a man (Chapter 4, Verse 11): “God commands you, concerning your children’s inheritance, to give the son the share of two daughters. If you have only daughters and they are more than two, they will receive two-thirds of the inheritance. If there is only one, she will receive half of the inheritance…”

Of course, the various apologists of Islamism – in the West and the East – constantly repeat that for what happens to women, Islam is not to blame, that true Islam is for equality, and that all the fault lies with tradition and social practices. They even invoke relevant chapters of the Quran. If this is indeed the case, the question naturally arises, how for so many centuries has Islam, while controlling every aspect of Muslim society, from sexual relations to nutrition, failed to eliminate the inequalities and injustices against 50% of its believers? (Kamguian Azam, 2005). The women of Turkey, as we have seen, the most liberated in the Islamic world, gained rights not through the renewal of Islam, but through the secular state and the principles of democracy and modernization promoted by Atatürk. But let us look at the chapters on “gender equality,” which Islamists so often invoke:

Chapter 3, paragraph 195 , “And the Lord he replied to them saying: None of your actions will go to waste, whether you are men or women. One is a member of the other. “

Chapter 4, paragraph 124 “Whoever does good, whether man or woman, and is at the same time a faithful Muslim, will enter Paradise, without losing even the tiniest part of their reward.”

Chapter 16, section 97 “Whoever has done some good deed and at the same time believed, whether man or woman, will be happy. We will give him a great reward, commensurate with his actions.”

Chapter 40, paragraph 40, “Whoever does evil will be paid with evil, and whoever does good (man or woman) and believes will be included in the company of God’s chosen ones who will enter Paradise, where they will enjoy all the endless goods.”

Of course, one does not need to analyze these four paragraphs to ascertain that the equality of men and women refers only to posthumous rewards and life in the grave. In contrast, the preceding paragraphs concerned provisions of family and inheritance law of earthly life.

3.2. η κατάργηση του φερετζέ και η μάχη για τη μαντήλα

The Islamic way of life is externally expressed through the complete coverage of the body, abstaining from alcohol, and censorship of art. The choice of style, according to Islamists, is not a matter of personal choice, but is directly linked to the moral principles of the community. The mandatory covering of women’s bodies is one of the most discussed mandates of Islamic law. God Himself, through the Quran, provides clear instructions. (chapter. 33, paragraph.59):”Prophet, command your wives, your daughters, and the wives of the believers to let their veils hang down over their chests. This will make it more unlikely for them to be recognized and molested” This isolation, anonymity, and separation of women from men is also reinforced by another directive of the Koran, in confirmation of apartheid and the complete control of women.

In Chapter 33, paragraph 53 , the believers are guided as follows: “Faithful, do not enter the prophet’s house without permission, unless he invites you to eat with him. Go to his house as invited guests. Get up to leave immediately after eating and do not chatter in your conversations with him. This may be considered an offense to him. He is too shy to tell you, but God is not shy to speak the truth. If you wish to ask something from his wives, ask it hidden behind a curtain. Thus, your hearts will remain pure. Try not to displease the Apostle of God. Never marry the women with whom he slept. This will be a great sin before the Lord. The issue of the headscarf and the chador obviously does not constitute humiliating treatment only of women by the Quran, but also of men whom it overall considers sex maniacs, ready to attack any “uncovered” woman. This system of moral values of Islam in Turkey, for many years, dating back to the time of the Empire, has led to daily political disputes between liberal modernists and conservative Islamists. It is true that many saw Atatürk’s modernization program, not as a step forward for the country, but as a sacrifice of the authentic Islamic/Turkish identity at the altar of the materialistic values of the West. In today’s era, the dispute over the dress code and particularly over the headscarf continues with unabated intensity and has been transferred to universities and the parliament.

The attire constituted a key element of Atatürk’s program for the modernization of the country, precisely because Kemal had recognized its symbolic, and not only, character in the struggle against outdated institutions. He personally toured to teach people what “civilized dressing” means. In a speech he gave in Kastamonu on August 30, 1925, Mustafa Kemal launched an attack against the veil, saying: ” In some places, I have seen women who put a cloth or something similar to cover their faces and who turn their backs or fall to the ground when a man passes by. What is the meaning and logic of this behavior? Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation adopt such a strange attitude, such a barbaric habit? Is it not a sight that ridicules the nation? It must stop immediately. (Lewis, p. 532-533). However, the great reformer did not dare to propose legislation against face covering. The revelation of the face, which had already been accepted by educated women in the big cities, progressed very slowly in the countryside.

In 1935, the banning of the hijab was proposed at a congress of the People’s Party, but even then no corresponding measures were taken. The hijab was only banned in public buildings, schools, and public services, while there was tolerance in other spaces, especially in rural areas. The hijab was associated with rural life, which is why women abandoned it when moving to the large cities. This mainly happened with the wave of urbanization that began in the 1950s. However, in our days, the struggle for the hijab and Islamic identity has rekindled, both within Turkey and in the international arena. On November 16, 2005, according to the Turkish newspaper “Milliyet,” the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stated that the European Court of Human Rights ” he did not have the authority to validate the headscarf ban in Turkish universities… On this matter, the court had no right to decide. This right belongs to the religious scholars of Islam. On the same day, Mr. Erdoğan was answered by Haluk Koç, an official of the Republican People’s Party: “Erdoğan showed his true face, but Turkey will not become a state of Ayatollahs” (To Vima, 17.11.2005). As Anthony Giddens aptly noted, (2004), “the battle for the headscarf is intense, emotionally charged, and truly global.” The dispute, as we see, continues today between the Kemalists, supporters of the secular state, and the Islamists, while at the same time, the Turkish intelligentsia continues to investigate and analyze the compatibility of Islam with democracy… Ernest Gellner, through his analysis of Islam, has already concluded that this compatibility is impossible. It is certainly a “struggle for power,” along with the “struggle for identity,” which has lasted for years, with an unpredictable outcome at present (Bora Kanra 2005). The study of the situation shows that the Islamists, having held political power in Turkey since 2002, seek once again to control the public space through the restriction of women’s presence and the imposition of the headscarf, an effort which actually aims at controlling female sexuality and gender relations. As Yesim Arat argues, it is very difficult to reconcile the Islamic ideology, where men are privileged, with the feminist perspective that seeks gender equality. Indeed, in contrast to the “right to choose” that feminists promote, Islam seeks to regulate all aspects of economic, social, and political life, as well as the rights and obligations of women. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable for the women’s movement to align with the secular state, defending women’s interests and fighting for a democratic framework that will recognize and promote the equality of men and women.

3.3. η συστημική βία κατά των γυναικών, τα εγκλήματα «τιμής» και ο παράδεισος με τις παρθένες

As we already know, Kemalist modernization did not include the private sphere and did not challenge the Islamic sexual morality of different measures and standards, which is responsible for extensive violence and criminal acts against women. The impact of reforms in this area was therefore very limited. The issue of violence entered public discourse in the 1980s by women’s organizations that had just begun to emerge. Sexuality became a topic, and in 1987 women’s organizations organized an awareness campaign with the main slogan “Shout loudly so everyone can hear you.” Of course, conservatives and reactionaries defended the traditional patriarchal view by saying the well-known misogynistic phrases “the stick came out of paradise” or “a rose blooms where a man strikes” (Blagojevich, 2003, Arat, 2000).

A study conducted by the Research Center for the Family as part of the National Program for the Integration of Women into Development (2000), with the participation of 4,287 individuals in 12 provinces, showed the exercise of physical violence in 34% of families, bullying and insults in 53%. Another survey, with a sample of 1,000 individuals, conducted in poor neighborhoods as well as at universities in Istanbul, revealed that 90% of women with low educational and economic levels suffered from domestic violence. In the better areas of the city where educated and high-income women resided, 60% reported domestic violence. Although 39.1% of university graduates proceeded to divorce, only 10.9% publicly admitted to the violence they had suffered.

On January 14, 1998, as a result of two decades of struggles by the women’s movement, the Turkish Parliament voted on a new law regarding domestic violence and family protection. However, 39.2% of women agree that a husband is justified in hitting his wife, and 63% of young women between the ages of 15 and 19 agree that beating can be justified (E.K. Opinion Bozgurt, 2005). These latest figures indicate that a large percentage of women have accepted and fully integrated the prescriptions of the Quran that we have already mentioned and have become a pillar of the patriarchal system of violence against women.

The most repulsive form of violence, which has not yet been effectively addressed, is the so-called “honor crimes,” which of course do not occur only in Turkey but throughout the realm of Islam, even in the Orthodox Balkans, where the roots of patriarchy are deep. In Turkey, the purity of women has always been the most important mechanism for controlling women’s freedom. The entire honor and reputation of the family depend on the virginity of women! Husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons are the usual executors and guardians of the family’s “honor.” “Tradition” is the excuse for the atrocities against women. Gogagioglu (2004) and other feminists from developing countries (Lazreg, Mani, Mohanti, Narayan & Spivak) argue that the issue is primarily linked to political and social dynamics. It is necessary, therefore, beyond tradition, to examine the structures of power, institutions, the distribution of gender roles, and the overall functioning of the system. “Tradition” is something static that resists changes. In contrast, institutions and mechanisms change it and can act to overturn the perpetuation of “tradition.”

On July 9, 2003, a written question submitted by the European Parliament (Karamana) to the European Commission referred to reports from the international press regarding testimonies that “In the Kurdish village of Yalim in Turkey, 35-year-old Semsiye Allak was stoned to death by her family after becoming pregnant from being raped by a married man. The woman died 7 months after her stoning, alone and abandoned in the hospital, while the man who had raped her was killed on the spot by her relatives, who “took the law into their own hands.” This horrific event is yet another example of the tragic consequences of “tradition,” as well as the structures of the system – both secular and not – that sustain such traditions. Of course, the Turkish Government, under pressure from the EU, amended the criminal law that provided light sentences for murderers (often also absolving them of any charges), but changing the culture and mentalities will certainly take more time.

The violence that erupted a few months ago in response to the publication of cartoons of the prophet can only be connected to the fate of women in the Islamic world. Certainly, the cartoons target the “Islam” system, which is personified through the Prophet. Three of the cartoons concern the lives of women in the Islamic world – oppression, honor crimes, but also the fairy tale of the virgins waiting for the suicide bombers in paradise, as a reward for their participation in the “holy war,” a fairy tale that offends the female gender as a whole and reveals the undervaluation and contempt of Islam towards women. The Quran refers in many places to the virgins clearly as objects for use and vessels of pleasure, which will be used by men as a reward for their faith:

Chapter 4, paragraph 57 “whoever believes and does good will enter gardens with flowing waters and will remain there eternally, where he will find pure women and pleasant shade.”

Chapter 37, verses 40-48 “God’s faithful servants will receive precious gifts… they will be surrounded by pure maidens with big black eyes.”

Chapter 44, paragraphs 51-55 , «Faithful Muslims will be in a safe place, in gardens and springs with clear waters, dressed in silk garments and sitting facing each other. This is their position. We will also give them dark-eyed maidens, they will taste every kind of fruit and rejoice in safety.

Chapter 56, paragraphs 35-38, “We fashioned the houris of Paradise in a special way and kept them pure virgins, dearly beloved by their husbands and always of the same age. They are destined for the people of the right side.”

Chap. 78, para 31-34, “For the righteous, a happy existence is reserved, gardens and vineyards, girls with large breasts who are their contemporaries, and pitchers full.”

It is impressive that in the controversy over the cartoons, there was no mention of the treatment of women by Islam, nor of course from the women’s side. However, we suspect, judging by the very sacred texts of Islam, that behind the uprising (demonstrations even in secular Turkey..), among other things, lies the attempt to preserve the “achievements” of male hegemony and absolute patriarchy in the Islamic world, which perpetuates the sexual morality of different criteria for men and women, forced marriages, the chador, polygamy, violence against women and children, virginity tests, the devaluation and exclusion of the female gender from politics and decision-making processes. No one questions anymore that violence against women and the strict dress code are used systematically to subjugate women, control their sexual lives, and thwart any reforms and modernizing measures that would improve women’s position.

Many argue that the Danish cartoons specifically targeted this very logic of the “Islam” system and certainly do not constitute a “western blasphemous attack.” In any case, the discussion about the limits of freedom of the press in the West would be very useful to include the rights of the terrified women of the Islamic world.

Gogagioglu insists that the only ray of light in this image is the changes that the topography of political relations can bring to the perception of “honor” crimes. Because the influence of tradition loses its power and retreats in the face of the actions of living political forces, in front of politically inspired policies and institutions, when they reveal and demystify the power relations inherent in honor crimes.

The treatment of women by Islam, as expected, affects the entire power system. Revelatory, both for the way the Turkish justice system operates and for how the “law enforcement” agencies treat women, is the complaint from Amnesty International (April 22, 2005). This international organization urges Turkish Justice to urgently review the case of two teenage girls who were raped and tortured by four police officers. This trial has been pending for over four years and has been postponed more than 30 times. The Turkish branch of Amnesty International provides horrific details about the torture suffered by the young women, who were imprisoned, while there have been no sufficient evidence found against the police officers (!). The same organization, as part of its global campaign against violence, supports the actions of renowned Turkish lawyer Canan Arin, who founded the first shelter for abused women. It is worth noting that there are currently 14 such shelters operating in Turkey (with a population of 70 million). The issue of violence has repeatedly concerned the European Parliament. In a related opinion from the Women’s Committee (June 10, 2005), it states that in Turkey the protection of women’s rights remains practically inadequate, especially regarding violence against women, and advises the government to focus more on the implementation of legislation, among other things, by urgently establishing shelters for abused women and supporting civil society initiatives by providing adequate resources from state and regional budgets, both to state centers and to those of NGOs.

4. WOMEN AND THE SOCIETY OF CITIZENS

4.1. η ανάπτυξη του φεμινιστικού κινήματος και η συμμετοχή στους δημοκρατικούς θεσμούς

The emphasis that Kemal placed on the public image and education of women had a positive effect, at least during the first two decades of the Republic. Women entered the Parliament in 1934, the first among many European countries. However, the momentum created in the early years of the reforms soon evaporated, under the pressure of daily economic hardship and the burden of a tradition that did not favor innovations. Today, women’s political participation in decision-making centers is alarmingly low, with women constituting only 4.4% of Parliament and just 1% of representatives in local assemblies. Their participation in economic and political decision-making centers is also meager (E.K., Bozkurt report 10.6.2005).

The National Report of Turkey on the status of women, towards the ^4th World Conference of the UN in Beijing (1995), spoke about the changes that occurred due to the activism of women in the 1980s and the improvement of living conditions and participation of women in democratic institutions. It notes positive developments and improvements in education and health, as well as institutional changes that allowed women to have greater control over their lives. Indeed, during the last two decades, civil society women vigorously challenged the patriarchal structures of the Turkish state and its relations with citizens, particularly with women. Despite difficulties and obstacles, the strong presence of women in the public sphere and their contribution to the modernization of Turkey since 1980 has been significant. The paradox occurred that, at a time of repression of fundamental freedoms and widespread fear following the military coup of 1980, the only social movement that had the courage to resist and make demands was the feminist movement. In 1984, the amendment of the Civil Code became a matter of public debate, while in 1985, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was ratified. Women’s organizations did not hesitate to engage in international campaigns for legislative change, particularly of the Civil Code, and brought the issue to the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing.

Feminism in Turkey, like in all countries, had many and different faces. Alongside the liberal feminists who supported the secular state, at the same time, a heterogeneous group of women who called themselves “Muslim feminists” insisted that they had the right to work in public services and study at universities with their heads covered, causing a rift with the official state. Some local courts ruled in favor of the headscarf, but usually, the supreme court declared the ruling unconstitutional. In cases where Islamists appealed to European courts, they did not find the support they were hoping for. Thus, the women of Islam were able to highlight the truly authoritarian nature of the state, but they did not succeed in transforming it or in presenting credible alternative proposals based on the “sacred texts” they promote.

The relationship between “secular” feminists and Muslim feminists varies. Some Kemalist feminists consider women wearing hijabs a threat to the secular roots of democracy, while others accept and support them. Meanwhile, Kurdish women, who suffer from a long history of accumulated problems (illiteracy, healthcare deterioration, poverty, exclusion, etc.), organized around the magazine “Roza,” which began publishing in March 1996, and later, in December 1996, around “Jijun,” in reaction to Kurdish nationalism, men, and Kemalists (Arat, 2000). All women’s organizations in Turkey had in common that they identified with the priorities and issues of Turkish society – violence against women, unemployment, amendments to the civil code. As Arat notes, Turkish feminism was “issue–oriented.” As expected, the activism of women’s organizations provoked a reaction from the conservative patriarchal establishment. On March 6, 2005, the police violently dispersed a peaceful demonstration organized by women’s organizations for International Women’s Day.

The establishment of the women’s organization KADER in 1997, which promoted education and support programs for women to occupy positions in democratic institutions, gave a significant boost to the public dialogue about the representation of women in Parliament, the government, and Local Government. The Greek-Turkish women’s organization Winpeace, which started in 1996 after the crisis in Imia, also plays an important role. It was initiated by Margarita Papandreou and Zeynep Oral, a well-known writer and activist, with the aim of promoting Greek-Turkish dialogue, establishing peace, and fostering better understanding and cooperation among women. The organization has developed significant political and feminist actions, in collaboration with the Eymir Culture Foundation, since 2002.

The European Parliament has called on political parties in Turkey to expand the role of women in the party hierarchy, to give them leadership roles in the party’s organizational structure, and to increase their members’ awareness of the importance of women’s political participation. Furthermore, to seek, train, and support female candidates for political office, in collaboration with other European political parties, in order to achieve substantial and mutual exchange of experiences and opinions. The European Commission and the European Parliament have repeatedly commended women’s organizations, recognizing the positive role that civil society plays in completing recent legislative reforms and promoting democratic changes. On June 10, 2005, the European Parliament called on the Turkish government to recognize the role of women’s rights organizations as partners of the government, to support them, to provide them with adequate funding, and to ensure their independence in action, in accordance with the practice of the European Union, also requesting the government to include NGOs in the negotiation process for EU membership.

5. THE EUROPEAN DREAM OF TURKEY

5.1. η προοπτική ένταξης στην ΕΕ

According to the preceding analysis, since the time of the Young Ottomans, the creation of the modern state has been linked to Europeanization and Western values. The establishment of the Turkish Republic (October 29, 1923) became identified with modernization, progress, and the supremacy of reason, while the ultimate goal set by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the acceptance of Turkey into the system of European states (Müftüler-Bac, 1999, Lewis 1961, Mardin, 1991). Similarly, Turkish society has understood the process of modernization as a process of Europeanization, through the adoption of European norms and ways of life. It is precisely within this Europeanization framework that women managed to acquire rights that are not common in other Islamic countries. When in 1923 Turkey made its first attempts to be accepted into the European family, it realized that one of the obstacles was the status of women. Therefore, within the modernization package that Kemal initiated, he included the emancipation of women, recognizing rights that were incredible for the early ^20th century and for an Islamic country. A few fortunate women from the socioeconomic elite formed the vanguard at that time. Paradoxically, 83 years after Kemal’s revolutionary changes, Turkey faces the same or similar problems. To be accepted into the European family as a full member, it must, among other things, fulfill the criteria related to women’s rights and gender equality, something that has already begun.

The institutional relationship between Turkey and the European Community dates back to 1961, when it applied for association with the EEC of the six, becoming the second country after Greece. Two years later, Turkey and the EEC signed an association agreement that mentioned the prospect of full membership. In 1995, the customs union came into effect, and in December 1999, the Helsinki European Council decided to grant Turkey candidate country status, with the consent of Greece, which this time did not use its veto. On October 3, 2005, Turkey received the EU’s approval to begin accession negotiations. This is a historic date for Turkey as it crowns the country’s long-standing efforts for modernization and Europeanization. The Council, in its decision of November ⁹, 2005, outlines in detail the principles, priorities, and conditions included in the partnership.

The ruling Islamic party AKP (Party of Justice and Development), which has been in power since 2002, has repeatedly presented itself as a modern party, just like the European Christian Democratic parties. It insists that it is committed to the secular Turkish state and the European path of the country, and simply disagrees with the exclusion of religious symbols from public life. The rise to power of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s party as well as his political rhetoric signal the gradual, contradictory, and conflictual assimilation of Islamism by Kemalism, but also the framing of Kemalism by Islamism, that is, the Kemalist transformation of Islamism. Erdoğan seeks to redefine secularism and adapt to the new realities, which he claims to transcribe into his own framework (Anagnostopoulou, 2004, p. 101). It is a fact, however, that the reforms within the framework of the pre-accession processes have stalled in recent months.

In an opinion of the European Parliament (Bozkurt, 25.06.2001) regarding the European perspective of Turkey, the high unemployment rate affecting women (39.6%) is noted, which is even higher in rural areas, and at the same time, the limited number of working women with social security – only 12% of the total insured workers. It is also emphasized that, despite the reference of Article 26 of the Labor Code to the principle of equal pay for equal work, women are paid less, work under unfavorable working conditions, with reduced wages and a lack of maternity protection measures, given the employer’s right to dismiss them after the end of parental leave. The European Parliament in its latest report on the European Strategy for Enlargement, on February 3, 2006 (Brok report), notes regarding Turkey, among other things, that although the political transition process has been initiated, the pace of change slowed down in 2005 and reminds Turkey that it must ensure the full independence of the judiciary, the elimination of torture and ill-treatment, and make strong efforts to promote women’s rights and combat violence. It also calls for the establishment of support centers for women threatened by violence. For its part, the Women’s Committee of the European Parliament (Opinion Bozkurt, 2005) calls for the mandatory establishment of shelters for women in all municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants and for NGOs providing similar services to be supported.

It is worth noting that thanks to the prospect of Turkey’s integration and the commitments it has undertaken, significant changes were made to the Turkish Constitution and family law. However, in the ^21st century, the dialogue about whether women can be present in public life without “causing unrest” continues, as does the confrontation and competition between Kemalists and Islamists.

5.2. το ευρωπαϊκό κεκτημένο για την ισότητα των φύλων και πως γεφυρώνεται το χάσμα ΕΕ-Τουρκίας

I will argue that the process of European integration, among other things, shapes but also disrupts existing gender relations, as we have seen in cases of accession of states with traditional structures (Greece). However, while various integration theories attempt to understand the nature of integration, very little has contributed to understanding gender dynamics and incorporating it into studies and research on the EU. In the case of Turkey, despite the fact that it is the best example of a Muslim country that recognized women’s rights very early, it required mobilization and pressure from the feminist movement to make changes that would bring it closer to European acquis and would give a boost to the pre-accession process. Until the end of the 1990s, Turkish legislation included various forms of discrimination against women and a pervasive patriarchal mindset ran through civil, criminal, and labor law, despite the constitutional mandate for gender equality and the fact that Turkey had signed all relevant international conventions. The situation began to change rapidly from 1998, with the adoption of the law on the prevention of domestic violence and then with the reform of the Civil Code in 2001 and the Criminal Code in 2004. Through these reforms, women gained the necessary legal basis for exercising their rights and claiming full gender equality. The new Civil Code abolishes the superiority of men in marriage, supports full gender equality in the family, provides for the equal distribution of property acquired during marriage between spouses, sets a minimum legal marriage age of ¹⁸ for both men and women (previously it was 17 for men and 15 for women), grants the same inheritance rights to children born out of wedlock, and allows unmarried individuals to adopt children (WWHR, 2005). Furthermore, in October 2001, Article 41 of the Constitution was amended, redefining the family as a unit “based on equality between spouses.”

In October 2000, the regular Report of the European Commission emphasized that serious effort is needed on the part of Turkey to ensure equal treatment, despite the fact that the Constitution recognizes gender equality. The 2003 Report notes that the new labor legislation introduced provisions, some of which are harmonized with the Directives on equal pay, equal opportunities, and the burden of proof. It also includes provisions for maternity leave and the protection of pregnant women. Furthermore, the constitutional amendments adopted by Parliament in May 2004 provide that: ” Men and women have equal rights. The State has a duty to ensure equality in practice.” In October 2005, the General Directorate for Women’s Rights was established with the aim of strengthening the position of women in economic, social, political, and cultural life. The Committee’s Report notes that despite the fact that the new penal code has only been in effect since June 2005, it has significantly strengthened fundamental rights; however, the transposition of Community Directives for gender equality and against all forms of discrimination is still needed.

All these changes and adjustments according to the European acquis were certainly not made with the blessings and consent of everyone. There were fierce reactions from conservative Islamists and nationalists who argued that the equality of men and women “would provoke anarchy and chaos in the family, while endangering the foundations of the Turkish nation.” The Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erdoğan, in September 2004, while Parliament was discussing the amendment of the criminal code, made a last-minute attempt to recriminalize adultery. His proposal was withdrawn in the face of public outrage and pressure from the European Union. The new criminal code was passed on September 26, 2004, after accepting about 30 amendments proposed by women’s organizations. The facts demonstrate that while Turkey’s European perspective propelled reforms, the contributions of women’s organizations and the competition that developed among them also helped abandon laws and practices that formed the backbone of Turkish society. Certainly, laws can change overnight, but the same does not happen with mindset and social stereotypes. It takes time to overcome perceptions and practices that are centuries old, especially when, as in the case of Turkey, they are supported by undisputed “sacred texts.” The case of Turkey is reminiscent in many ways of the changes promoted in Greece in the 1980s, when it also had to adjust its legislation to the European acquis in order to gain a functioning democracy and a strong and competitive economy. Many express the view that the historical choice of the path of “European Turkey” is beneficial for the Turkish people, beneficial for the European Union, and above all beneficial for Greece (Veremis, 2002, p. 15). We can confidently add that it is also exceedingly beneficial for the women of Turkey.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Deniz Kandiyoti, Meltem Müftuler-Bac, Yesim Arat, and other feminists are right. The working hypothesis that the women of Turkey were emancipated (at least partially) by the Kemalist reforms, but were not freed from the heavy bonds imposed by Islamic and patriarchal culture, is confirmed by the preceding analysis. Despite the significant changes brought about by Kemal, women still face oppressive discrimination and inequalities against them. The agents of this oppression are the Mediterranean culture with its codes of “honor” and “shame,” Islamic tradition with its divinely revealed regulations of women’s behavior, as well as Kemalist ideology with the stereotype of the asexual, self-sacrificing woman.

In defiance of extensive reforms and the marginalization of Islam by Kemal, the essence of culture remained almost untouched. This is the great paradox, as the analysis showed. Kemalist modernization recognized rights for women, at least on paper, creating the illusion that women in Turkey had solved all their problems, resulting in educated and professionally working women produced by Kemalist modernization not participating in the women’s movement until the 1980s, mainly because they had not realized the extensive violations of women’s rights and the lack of education, employment, human rights, and fundamental individual freedoms.

The women of Turkey, only through women’s organizations and their active participation in the emerging civil society, managed to shake the foundations of the patriarchal authoritarian state and, from different perspectives, to call into question the relationship between the state and citizens, and especially its relationship with women. Even if they did not manage to change the basic perceptions of the state, nation, and Islam, they nonetheless demonstrated the limits of these perceptions and marked the public dialogue. The European framework and the European perspective of the country provide fertile ground for this dialogue, which concerns not only the future of women’s rights but also the economic and social development of Turkey.

The rise of political Islam should be interpreted as a result of its violent marginalization in previous decades, something that had never been accepted by the majority of the people, but also as a result of the development of the middle class in rural areas and provincial towns, for whom Islam is part of their daily lives. The adoption of Islam as a kind of state religion in 1982, as a distraction from the rise of the left, and its incorporation into the secular power structure demonstrates the importance attributed to Islam by the general public, but also the difficulties and limitations faced by Kemalist modernization.

The major changes, as it seemed, represented the vision of a single charismatic political leader, the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as well as the values of a small number of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois citizens. The Turkish Republic defined the characteristics of the modern state and the ideal woman and propagated this ideal to a population that held very different values and perceptions about the role and behavior of women. Thus, those reforms did create a generation of strong and emancipated women, but not without cost. In any case, the opportunities and rights that Kemalist modernization offered to women should not be underestimated. Those early changes laid the foundations for the future completion of women’s rights, within the framework of the European acquis. Slowly, but steadily, with the help of the EU, the women of Turkey are finding their way to liberation.

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• Lewis Bernard, 1961, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, translated by Papazisis 2002
• LewisBernard, 2004, TheCrisisofIslam, Phoenix, London
• MacMillan Margaret, 2001, Peacemakers, p. 444, John Murray Publishers, London
• Mango Andrew, 1999, Atatürk, John Murray (Publishers)
• Mardin Serif, 1971, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution”, International Journal of Middle East studies, Vol 2,1971, pp. 197-211
• Müftüler-Bac, M., 1999, “Turkish Women’s Predicament”, Women’s Studies International Forum, vol.22, No 3, pp.303-315
• Murphy, Cl., 2004, “Spotlight on Turkish Women’s Rights”, BBC NEWS, 23.9.2004
• Norris, P. &R Inglehart, 2004, Sacred and Secular, Cambridge University Press
• Sadic J. al-Azm, 2005, “Is Islam Secularizable?”, Institute for the Secularization of Islamic Society, Feb. 2005.
• Tacettin G., 1993, “The Concept of Islamism within Ziya Gökalp’s Sociology”, www.metu.edu.tr/home/wwwsbe/thabs/1993/soc_abs_93.html
• Tekeli Shirin, 1992, “Europe, European Feminism, and Women in Turkey”, Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 139-143
• The Economist, 2006, (June 24-30), “Wife of the Nation’s Father”, σ. 36
• White, J., 2003, Report, “State Feminism, Modernization and the Turkish Republican Woman”, NWSA Journal, 2003, vol.15, No 3 (Fall)
• Winpeace, www.winpeace.gr
• WWHR (Women for Women Human Rights), February 2005, «New Ways»
• Zehra F. & Kabasakal Arat, 2003, “Where to look for the Truth: Memory and interpretation in Assessing the Impact of Turkey’s Women Education”, Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp.57-68, 2003
• Zeitinoglu, I., 1994, “Employment of Women and Labour Laws in Turkey”, Comparative Labour Law Journal, 15 (2), 177-205

Greek-speaking:

• Athanassopoulou, E., 2005, lectures MSc, 10.11.2005 & 22.12.2005
• Anagnostopoulou Sia, 2004, Turkish Modernization, Vivliorama
• Veremis Thanos, ed. 2002, Contemporary Turkey: Political System, Economy and Foreign Policy, ed. Papazisis
• European Parliament, 2006, “Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the Commission’s strategy paper on Enlargement – 2005/2206(ΙΝΙ), rapporteur: Brok, E., 3.2.2006»
• European Parliament, 2001, “Opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, rapporteur: Karamanou A., 25.6.2001″
• European Parliament, 2003,”Dressing Rules for Women Workers in Turkey,” , Question Κaramanou Α., 10.07.2003
• European Parliament, 2003, Stoning of Semsiyye Alak”, Question byΚaramanou, 9.7.2003
• European Parliament, 2004, “Opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the progress towards Turkey’s EU accession, rapporteur: Karamanou A., 26/1/2004″
• European Parliament, 2005, “Report of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality on the Role of Women in Turkey in Social, Economic and Political Life, Rapporteur Bozkurt Emine, June 10, 2005″
• To VIMA, 2005, “Anti-European shots by Erdogan regarding the headscarf,” 17.11.2005
• The Holy Quran, 2002, ed. Kaktos
• Chalazias Christos, 2001, Political Islam, Domios Publishing.

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