THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS
SCHOOL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Master’s Program: “European and International Studies”
LESSON: EUROPE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
PROFESSOR: P. Ioakeimidis
THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
Anna Karamanou
June 2005
CONTENTS.
- INTRODUCTION
- THE COURSE OF AN UNCERTAIN RELATIONSHIP
- The Cold War and the Doctrine of Deterrence
- The “Atlantic Corporate Relationship,” the McNamara Doctrine, and the Withdrawal of France from NATO
- The War in Vietnam, the French May of 1968, and the Opening Towards the East
- The Collapse of the Monetary Agreement
- The “Rewarmed” Relations, Globalization, and the European Monetary System
- The Nuclear Threat, the Arms Race, and the Star War
- THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE TRANSATLANTIC GAP
- The NEW THREATS AND THE NEW DECLARATION
- THE NEW IDENTITY AND COMMON VALUES
- ΟΙ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΕΣ ΔΙΕΝΕΞΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ Η ΝΕΑ ΑΤΖΕΝΤΑ
- EVALUATION OF THE TEN-YEAR COURSE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA
- The High Politics of the USA (use of force) and the Low Politics of the EU (environment)
- THE UNILATERALITY OF US POLICY
- AMERICA IS FROM MARS AND EUROPE IS FROM VENUS
- The Great Chessboard
- Smart Weapons Do Not Win Peace
- CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES IN EU-US STRATEGIES
- The “Axis of Evil” and Preventive Wars
- The New Dimensions of Security – The European Strategy
- Similarities and Differences
- International Terrorism Does Not Unite
- The European Dream of the Professor from Maryland
- CONCLUSIONS
- BIBLIOGRAPHY
THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
or THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARES – APHRODITE..
Anna Karamanou – June 2005
INTRODUCTION
Transatlantic relations are a very painful history. It is a story of love and hate, cooperation and competition, friendship and hostility throughout its historical journey. If we had to characterize this long-standing and significant relationship with one word, I would choose the word “uncertainty,” which is used by Professor A.S. Milward in his study “The Uncertain Alliance” (1984). Uncertainty has created significant problems for both politicians in shaping their strategies and for theorists-academics whenever they attempted to theorize and critically analyze this minimally institutionalized relationship. Their difficulty mainly lies in identifying the continuity and coherence (if there is one) between declarations and political action.
As the facts I will present show, the institutions, rhetoric, mistrust, different approaches, and generally the problems that characterized transatlantic relations since the late 1940s have remained largely the same in the post-Cold War period, even until today. The context of the discussions, the compliments, and the “confession of faith” exchanged by European officials with their counterparts during the recent visit of the U.S. President to Brussels last February reminded in many ways of similar meetings and statements from a few decades ago. Certainly, their statements once again provide valuable material for theorists and political analysts who will attempt, through beautiful words, to diagnose the truth:
The President of the European Commission, Mr. Barroso, considered it his duty to emphasize that: “The relationship between the USA and Europe forms the strongest, the most comprehensive, and strategically the most important relationship in the world,” while Mr. Bush, in response, argued that: “Today, security, justice, and prosperity in the world depend on the close cooperation between America and Europe to achieve common goals. This makes our transatlantic ties vital, as always. My government and the United States wish for the European endeavor to succeed. A strong Europe is in our interests…” Certainly, everyday life will once again demonstrate whether the rhetoric of the leadership has any relation to action…
It is indeed a fact that the Euro-Atlantic relationship, sixteen years after the end of the Cold War, is gaining interest once again, not only for politicians and academics but also for ordinary citizens. The discussion is lively, interesting, and, as Professor Erik Jones says, with all that is being said about Mars and Venus, it is also very sexy! (Jones 2004).
With a brief review of the historical course, the assessment of the relationships, and the critical analysis of the most significant events, I will attempt with this paper to highlight the key aspects of the multifaceted Euro-Atlantic relations and the roots of conflicts, as well as to investigate the extent to which the theory of interdependence is confirmed or refuted in these relations.
THE COURSE OF AN UNCERTAIN RELATIONSHIP
It is said that history is written by the victors, and thus historical and political orthodoxy is shaped by the values, interests, and perspectives of the powerful. The history of Euro-Atlantic relations from the 1940s onwards has mostly been written within an ideological and political framework that has been characterized by political and academic analysts as “Pax Americana.” The literature on the subject is enormous.
Officially, the relationship celebrates sixty years this year, as many as the victory against Nazism and Fascism in Europe. Euro-Atlantic relations were founded and maintained primarily due to the joint response to the Soviet threat. Their roots, of course, as well as the uncertainties that accompanied them from the outset, go much further back than World War II, to the 1920s and 1930s. However, the beginning of an official American presence and the expression of interest in European affairs is placed in the last years of World War II. Therefore, the relationship developed during a period of instability, uncertainty, and significant changes in the international system. In many ways, the evolution of Euro-Atlantic relations since 1945 provides a subject for the study of the risks and difficulties that come with changes in the international system, as well as interdependence relations (Milward,1984).
Between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, changes emerged in the ties between the two sides of the Atlantic, the consequences of which are still felt today. While it initially seemed that there was a danger the United States would return to its pre-war isolationism, refusing to take on responsibilities for the functioning of a diplomatic system centered on Europe, within five years a framework of diplomatic, strategic, and economic relations was created that proved resilient over time and adaptable. The U.S. initially encouraged European Defense Cooperation, in accordance with the Brussels Treaty of 1948, but then moved towards the creation of NATO, based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, as a framework for self-defense. In short, the selective security of the alliance replaced the collective security envisioned by the UN Charter (Joseph S. Nye & R. Keohane, 1992).
Around 1950, a complex system of mutual obligations had already been established between Europe and the United States. Of course, there were differences in the degree of consensus between the U.S. and Western Europe regarding the essence and meaning of the obligations. The greatest agreement was found in the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe, where the benefits were measurable and American generosity undeniable (Treverton, 1992). However, the closest relationship was created on issues of strategy and security, without this meaning that there were no differences regarding the mechanisms and mainly the processes (as today). This is again linked to uncertainty, different approaches regarding the nature of the problems, or even to the answer to the question that still awaits an answer: How real was the Soviet threat, or the communist threat to Western Europe?
The Cold War and the Doctrine of Deterrence
The Truman Doctrine, or “deterrence,” and the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance reflected the political perceptions, especially in the U.S., regarding the nature of the threat. The Korean War inaugurated a period of consolidation of Euro-American relations; however, it did not mark the end of tensions and uncertainties about how these relations should be organized and developed. There were significant disagreements regarding German disarmament and France’s proposals for a European Defense Community as the most effective means of limiting Germany’s military power. The situation was then salvaged by the British compromise proposal, whereby West Germany was linked to NATO through the creation of the Western European Union, which of course thwarted any plans and initiatives for an autonomous European defense. (Milward)
During the 1950s, with the increase in military (and particularly nuclear) power of the Soviet Union, tensions and uncertainties continued primarily over two issues: the possession and control of nuclear weapons and the status of Germany. The Soviet “superiority” in missiles and the Americans’ efforts to expand their tactical nuclear presence in Western Europe led to significant differences of opinion regarding the risks associated with nuclear balance. At the same time, on the economic front, the beginning of European integration that led to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 raised new issues of uncertainty regarding the extent of American support for a customs union, such as that of the EEC.
The period 1955-60 inaugurated a series of initiatives and trends, some of which were to cause great friction and endless discussions. The most serious was the crisis with the Suez Canal (1956), which led to open conflict within the Atlantic Alliance due to the changes it brought about in the Middle East, where the interests of France and Britain in the region were at stake (Kern 2005). Meanwhile, the increase in dissatisfaction in the Eastern Bloc led to the violent suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and by the end of the 1950s forced the alliance to turn its attention once again to the central arena of the Cold War.
The “Atlantic Corporate Relationship,” the McNamara Doctrine, and the Withdrawal of France from NATO
With the start of the 1960s, it became clear that a new type of international community was emerging, a new era of creation and development: the tensions within NATO in no way threatened the future of the alliance, nor did they call into question American commitment to the security of Western Europe. During the same period, American political and business circles were recognizing the new opportunities – commercial and investment – offered by the new major European market. In this spirit, the Kennedy administration began to promote the idea of the “Atlantic Partnership,” which would lead cooperation beyond traditional alliances and would be based on the equality of the U.S. and the expanding Western Europe. However, during the same period, Americans were not willing to relinquish their preeminence in the field of nuclear weapons strategy, as evidenced by the so-called McNamara Doctrine in 1962, which clashed with de Gaulle’s policy in France and caused a significant rift in Euro-Atlantic relations (Palmer 1988).
Gcolonialism also viewed with suspicion the “special relationship” between Britain and the USA, which was expressed through the reaction to Britain’s entry into the EEC. The French veto in January 1963 undermined any efforts to create a united Europe that could assume an equal role with that of the USA, and American policy did not miss an opportunity in the following years to highlight the disagreements between European countries, whether accidentally or deliberately. (the scenario resembles the present). The main areas of disagreement concerned: a/ trade relations, particularly during the so-called “Kennedy round” and the Europeans’ suspicion towards the challenges posed by large American corporations b/ the attempt to create a multilateral nuclear force and c/ the gradual American involvement in Vietnam (Milward).
The Euro-Atlantic relations by the end of the Johnson administration in 1968 gave the impression of a battlefield. France left NATO in 1966, the multilateral nuclear force was put in the drawer, and trade and monetary relations were points of continuous friction, especially in light of the American trade deficit. Furthermore, after the crisis with the missiles in Cuba in 1962, American interest seemed to shift from Western Europe of many and diverse states towards the creation of a “condominium” among the great powers (ibid). When Lyndon Johnson announced his decision to retire from the presidency in March 1968, transatlantic relations were very fluid. Some of the causes had a long history – the Gaullist reaction, the growing concerns of the Americans about their position in the global economy, and issues of burden-sharing within NATO.
The War in Vietnam, the French May of 1968, and the Opening Towards the East
The prospects for normalizing relations were undermined by a series of events, such as the war in Vietnam, which highlighted the differing approaches between the two sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, social uprisings broke out in France and elsewhere that complemented the scene of a turbulent period. The old order was called into question in both the military and economic spheres. Many researchers place the shift in European perceptions of the U.S. immediately after the assassination of Kennedy, but mainly with the war in Vietnam. This war, along with the escalation of nuclear armament throughout the 1960s, caused aversion and radicalism among the youth, with long-lasting effects (Palmer).
At that time, changes began in the strategic sector, which started to be reshaped, to change style, and to turn towards a balance of power (in reality, the balance of terror), under the leadership of Nixon and Kissinger. This political realignment was encouraged by the Soviet Union, but it was evident that the role of Western Europe was limited, as the superiority of the United States in the field of nuclear weapons was indisputable and that was precisely what mattered in the process of détente. The result was a prevailing mutual suspicion: Were the Americans and Soviets playing games at the expense of Western Europe?
Two incidents underscored the problem: the Treaty for the Limitation of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Non Proliferation Treaty) and Germany’s promotion of Ostpolitik, with the aim of easing tensions in Central and Eastern Europe. Both of these initiatives clashed with the perceptions of Americans. The opponents of détente, which began during Nixon’s presidency (1968) and collapsed during Ford and Carter (1974-1980), considered the policy of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union as “immoral,” because it essentially equated the U.S. (the world of good) with the Soviet Union (the world of evil) and accepted the dismemberment of Europe (Evryviadis 2004). The events of that time thus demonstrate that the “logic” of conservatives preceded the Bush doctrine by a long way. It has simply returned more forcefully today, with the war against terrorism.
The Collapse of the Monetary Agreement
On the economic front, the international economic order also faced problems. By 1968, it was clear that trade and other aspects of Western policy were threatened by the collapse of the monetary agreement of 1958. Economic divergences and the weakness of the dollar and the pound were putting immense pressure on the exchange rate system established by the Bretton Woods agreement. In August 1971, there was a devaluation of the dollar. At the same time, Germany emerged as the only major European country with internal monetary stability, with the mark taking a leading role in the markets. The dominance of the mark was maintained until the establishment of the EMU in the late 1990s (McKinnon, 2002).
Until 1973, little had been preserved from the Bretton Woods system, and expanded Europe was in complete inability to impose order on the chaos of exchange rates. At the same time, Western Europeans were called to endorse the “New Atlantic Charter,” which would create the basis for a new community. The “Year of Europe,” as declared by Kissinger, ended with bitter exchanges and accusations, fueled by the October War in the Middle East and the ensuing oil crisis. 1974 was marked by changes in almost all leaderships of Western Europe, as well as in the US, but the new governments of Ford, Wilson, Schmidt, and Giscard d’Estaing did not seem very happy with the prospect of an “Atlantic Community.”
The “Rewarmed” Relations, Globalization, and the European Monetary System
In the years that followed, 1975 and 1976 saw many efforts for the “rebuilding” of relations. However, the world had already undergone profound changes. One parameter of these changes was “globalization,” that is, the process through which many of the problems in Euro-American relations had global repercussions. Now energy, trade, economic recession, and industrial policy would have to be examined within a broader system, rather than in a regional or “Atlantic” context. The essence was that “Atlantic” problems could no longer be isolated from the spillover effects they caused in the rest of the world. The Tokyo Round, which started in the mid-1970s, had to deal with such issues as well. Within the European Community, economic discrepancies inflated the problems and showed the goal of economic and monetary union to be unfeasible.
However, in 1978-79, some progress was made with the introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS), mainly as a defensive measure against American economic policy (Kenen, 2002). The complications concerned two main directions: First, economic cooperation, which was threatened by a new American nationalism and protectionism; second, the area of “high politics” and the efforts of the EEC countries to develop common foreign policy goals through “Political Cooperation.” Tensions arose in the Middle East in 1983, while in other regions the crisis brought underlying differences in positions to the fore (Iran, Poland, and Afghanistan). It was not only that European solidarity was simply in question, but also that American policy under Carter and Reagan was confused and suffered from internal rivalries and contradictions.
The Nuclear Threat, the Arms Race, and the Star War
Many of the symptoms of instability and confusion also related to NATO’s politics. One of the critical issues remained the distribution of burdens. Despite the promise to increase defense spending by 3% by the end of the 1970s, all NATO members, including the U.S., did not meet their obligations. The whole issue was also entangled with nuclear weapons and the development by the Soviet Union of new and more destructive missiles (especially the SS-20). European leaders faced a significant dilemma in agreeing to have Pershing II and Cruise missiles stationed on their territory due to the considerable public backlash against any escalation of nuclear armaments.
During this entire period, the Americans maintained distrust towards many of their European allies and perceived the threat of Eurocommunism as real, particularly for France and Italy. They did not consider them reliable allies. On their part, the Europeans had serious disagreements with American policy in Latin America (El Salvador, Nicaragua, and later Canada), in Asia (Iran and Afghanistan), and in Europe itself (Poland). In the early 1980s, there were serious doubts about the survival of the Western Alliance, more than at any other time; however, it was clear that many of the problems were the same as those that had concerned it throughout its history and were always linked to economic, military, and social upheavals. Throughout the 1980s, the economic, political, and military world of the Atlantic Alliance was shaken by disagreements on both sides of the Atlantic, wrote John Palmer in 1988, emphasizing that: “It is evident that the crisis in American-European relations is not a passing phase but a central element of a systemic crisis of the Western economic and political order.”
After the stock market crash of 1987 and the dramatic fall of the dollar, the Euro-Atlantic differences on issues of managing the international financial system and global trade deepened. Several hardline Reaganites did not hide their dislike for the European allies, whom they considered unreliable, irresponsible, and carefree riders seeking refuge and security under the American nuclear umbrella, while at the same time undermining American interests elsewhere. (Palmer). In the same spirit was the response of Deputy Defense Secretary Richard Perle when asked to comment on the reactions of the Europeans to Reagan’s Star Wars initiative.
Throughout the 1980s, intense commercial disputes were prominent, and no side, of course, had a monopoly on virtue. The Americans accuse the Europeans of their protective agricultural policy, that they are gradually moving towards an economic and commercial “Fortress Europe,” and that they are abandoning the philosophy of free trade on which Atlantic cooperation was based. On their part, the Europeans accuse the Americans of yielding to lobbyists for the protection of a range of industrial products, such as steel, as well as agricultural products. (Palmer). Certainly, both the USA and the European Community were responsible for the problems and the restrictions they were trying to impose on free trade.
THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE TRANSATLANTIC GAP
With the end of the Cold War in 1989, a new era begins for transatlantic relations and for all of humanity. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the removal of the Soviet threat radically changed the nature of international relations. From a focus on defense and arms, we moved to the search for different forms of pursuing foreign policy, with particular emphasis on democratic and human rights, health, education, the elimination of poverty, the rule of law, humanitarian aid, the environment, trade, demographic ratios, the fight against terrorism, and organized crime.
Many predicted that the alliance would dissolve, as the European Community, NATO, and other multilateral institutions faced difficulties in agreeing on their new roles, even in areas where they had cooperated effectively. Prominent Europeans, including the President of Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel, called for the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, two years later, Czechoslovakia was seeking to join NATO. The USA sought and succeeded in using international institutions to maintain its political and economic influence in Europe, while the EU delayed in putting into action what the French Minister of Defense Jean-Pierre Cheveneman had expressed since 1989: “international events are encouraging us to take our defense into our own hands, at the moment this opportunity is offered to us (Nye & Keohane, 1992).
THE NEW THREATS AND THE NEW DECLARATION
It is a fact that the emergence of non-traditional threats after the end of the Cold War made negotiations and the formation of a common understanding of the nature of threats and security very difficult (Reicke, 2005). The question that arose, both for the EU and for the USA, was to what extent they could collaborate creatively in a world that had changed radically. The Declaration of 1990 and, above all, the New Transatlantic Agenda agreed upon in 1995, are major milestones for the post-Cold War Atlantic alliance and serve as reference points even when differences and disputes appear to be insurmountable. From well-written documents and statements of good intentions, there is nothing else…
Transatlantic disagreements about the crisis in the Balkans once again jeopardized Euro-Atlantic unity and escalated with the management of the crisis in Kosovo and later with the war in Iraq, which created the “Euro-Atlantic trauma” (Herd 2003). Although transatlantic partners share many common assessments of contemporary threats, they disagree on how to manage those threats, particularly on how, when, and why to use military force. This strategic gap is widened by asymmetry in military and technological capabilities, which in its extreme form presents as a dichotomy between unilateral European inertia and unilateral American activism. According to Herd, this has led political analysts to argue that one of three future scenarios will occur: either a friendly separation (Daalder, 2003), a strategic divorce (Kagan, 2003), or strategic restructuring and renewal (Asmus and Pollack, 2002).
THE NEW IDENTITY AND COMMON VALUES
According to the theory, organizations tend to reproduce themselves through new forms of legitimation, even when the original raison d’être has disappeared. In these cases, they mobilize arguments that concern either common interests or common norms and usually refer to solidarity and shared history. In the case of the Atlantic alliance, something similar would mean that it is more than just a traditional military alliance (Sjursen, 2004). The main argument around the reorganization of NATO is that shared liberal democratic values and norms are essential for the cohesion of the alliance, and it is upon this common identity that NATO has focused its attention in the post-war period.
Many who criticize the realists and neo-realists, such as Thomas Risse, argue that it was not only the Soviet threat that created the Atlantic Alliance, although it contributed to strengthening the sense of common purpose. The roots of the alliance should be sought in the alliance of France, Britain, and the USA during World War II, which created a sense of community and common values. At the center of these values was the principle of democracy. A more thorough study, according to Risse, confirms the working hypothesis that democratic states can create common security based on the same democratic principles that govern their functioning in domestic politics.
ΟΙ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΕΣ ΔΙΕΝΕΞΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ Η ΝΕΑ ΑΤΖΕΝΤΑ
Soeren Kern argues that the greatest tensions that arose in transatlantic relations in the post-Cold War period concern trade more than security issues, citing as an example 1989, when Washington imposed tariffs on a range of European agricultural products following Brussels’ decision to ban imports of hormone-fed beef.
In 1995, Clinton expressed fears that trade disputes were poisoning the entire transatlantic relationship, and leaders on both sides of the Atlantic began to seek a new major initiative or another political gesture to prevent the disintegration of the transatlantic alliance. In June 1995, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in a speech in Madrid titled “Designing a New Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st Century,” called for broad economic and political cooperation. In an effort to reshape relations within the new framework of the globalized economy, Clinton and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González signed the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in December 1995 at the EU-U.S. Summit in Madrid.
NDA, which completed the Declaration of 1990, serves as the main connecting link between Brussels and Washington and created an institutional framework, at a high level, for the resolution of disputes. In reality, while the Transatlantic Declaration concerned an advisory relationship, the NDA concerned joint action. The NDA, which covers economy, trade, and security, proposes joint action in four main areas: 1/ promoting peace, democracy, and development in the world 2/ responding to global challenges 3/ contributing to the expansion of global trade and closer economic relations and 4/ bridges across the Atlantic (Kern)
In May 1998, at the Birmingham Summit, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership was announced, which mainly concerned the reduction of trade barriers and overcoming regulatory obstacles. In March 2002, the EU and the US launched a dialogue on financial markets, in May 2002 the Positive Economic Agenda was designed to mitigate trade disputes, and in June 2004, at the Summit in Ireland, the two sides agreed on the “Roadmap for Cooperation and Transparency.” The two sides worked well together in the new round of negotiations that began in Doha in November 2001, under the World Trade Organization. However, the failure of the Cancun summit in September 2003, mainly due to disagreements between developed and developing countries, also harmed transatlantic relations.
EVALUATION OF THE TEN-YEAR COURSE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA
The decade of the NDA is positive from an economic perspective, as it is the best period in the history of transatlantic economic integration. The economies of the EU and the US now represent the strongest and most interdependent economic partnership in the world, constituting 41% of global GDP, 38% of global trade, 32% of imports, 27% of exports, 58% of incoming capital flows, and 77% of outgoing flows. Foreign investments, which are the backbone of the Atlantic economy, are thriving. American companies invested more capital abroad in the 1990s—over $750 billion—than in the previous four decades. Of this, about half went to Europe (Elcano Royal Institute 2005).
The US invests in Ireland twice as much as in China, and American capital in Germany is greater than the total of American capital in Latin America. The EU today provides American companies with 50% of their total global profits. Correspondingly, European investments in the US have reached $850 billion, which is higher than American investments in Europe, with European companies being the leaders in investments in 44 out of 50 states. There are more investments from European companies only in Texas than the total of American investments in Japan (Elcano Royal Institute).
Thus, despite any disagreements, throughout the decade there was a tightening rather than a loosening of relations. The Transatlantic Agenda proved to be more effective for the economy and trade than for the strategic planning of defense and security. However, in June 2003, the Summit in Washington, under the Greek Presidency of the EU, resulted in the signing of the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement and extradition agreements, as well as the initiation of negotiations for Air Transport.
The High Politics of the USA (use of force) and the Low Politics of the EU (environment)
The issues that tested transatlantic relations primarily concerned security beyond borders. It is a fact that there are differences in culture, military strength, and assessments of situations. Given their military superiority, the US often prefers to act unilaterally. Many argue that this is also linked to the complex structure and decision-making system of the EU. Despite the progress that has been made towards the CFSP, the EU still does not speak with one voice on many issues. As a consequence, Americans see Europe as divided and in constant confusion. This impression is further reinforced by the impatience and haste of almost all European leaders to strengthen their own bilateral relations with the US. Which European leader would refuse an invitation to Crawford for fear of offending their European partners, Soeren Kern rightly wonders. (Karamanlis, however, was quick to respond…).
In addition, in Washington they deal with “high politics,” such as the use of force, while the EU focuses on “low politics,” such as trade, industry, and environmental policy. This leads the US to believe that the best way to communicate with the EU on security issues is bilaterally with the member states or through NATO. Opportunistic “coalitions of the willing” are already considered the most beneficial for promoting American interests. This is why the Bush administration decided to limit summit meetings to one per year.
Nevertheless, transatlantic relations can be credited with efforts for the restoration of peace, democracy, and stability in the Balkans and the provision of economic and technical assistance for the establishment of institutions and the reconstruction of countries, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Thus, the final assessment of NATO, despite any weaknesses, is rather positive.
THE UNILATERALITY OF US POLICY
After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States emphatically supported their decision to undertake military action in order to ensure their protection from future attacks. This development naturally caused concern within the EU, as the Bush administration’s shift towards a unilateral approach to international developments became evident (Dalis 2004). Indicative of Atlantic intentions is the article by American lawyer from Virginia, Mr. Jeffrey Cimbalo in the magazine Foreign Affairs last November, titled “Saving NATO from Europe,” in which he argues that the European Constitutional Treaty aims to balance rather than complement American power, something for which the U.S. is unprepared. The article emphasizes that “through its structure and existing trends, the EU would attempt to magnify its power at the expense of NATO… while the security provisions indicate that for the first time the Atlantic Alliance is threatened internally by Europe.”
The policy of George W. Bush constitutes the apex of unilateralism. The stance of the United States towards the Kyoto Protocol on climate, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the draft agreement on the trafficking of small arms, the war against the International Criminal Court (accompanied by threats against allies who supported it), the tone of the new strategic doctrine—all these, which had begun in 1994 when the Republicans won the majority in the House of Representatives, indicate a break with the previous policy. The major crisis, of course, concerns the war in Iraq, which was organized without NATO cooperation, in an atmosphere of secrecy and with the participation only of Britain. Many analysts argue that the United States today is a different country from what it was in 1999 and not only because of September 11. Iraq and Bush’s broader policy in the Middle East not only dissipated the wave of international solidarity generated by 9/11 but have also led the index of global anti-Americanism back thirty years (Pagoulatos, 2004).
These developments align with the analyses of the “realists,” who argue that a hegemonic power provokes a balancing coalition of smaller states against it. Certainly, such a development does not seem to seriously concern the neo-conservatives in Washington. However, according to the school of realism, this is very likely and has already begun to emerge on the horizon.
AMERICA IS FROM MARS AND EUROPE IS FROM VENUS
Many analysts on both sides of the Atlantic talk about an increasing gap between the US and Europe. The American former State Department advisor Robert Kagan, in his book “Of Paradise and Power” and in his article in Policy Review, “Power and Weakness,” discusses unbridgeable differences in all areas and states, “it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans have a common vision for the world, or that they even live in the same world.” Kagan believes that the US and Europe represent two completely different worlds and bases all his arguments on the necessity and value of raw “power,” (the effectiveness of power, the morality of power, the desire for power) that the US possesses and that Europeans lack, who, as he writes, live in their own world… “in the world of laws and rules, of international negotiation and cooperation… Europe is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, realizing Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace.'”
It is interesting and highly instructive to watch for a while the “realistic” delirium of Kagan. “The USA follows history and exercises power in the Hobbesian anarchic world, where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security, defense, and the promotion of a liberal order depend on the possession and use of military force. This is why in major strategic and international issues today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” Kagan leaves no doubt about the school of thought to which he belongs, and of course what he writes does not simply describe a situation, but outlines policy and shows the way of unilateral action and contempt for international law. Henry Kissinger, in a recent article in the Washington Post and in VIMA, expressed more balanced positions: “The USA is the dominant democratic power in the world and as such must relate values and power, institutional political changes and geopolitical necessities…”
The Great Chessboard
Another famous strategy guru, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his renowned book “The Grand Chessboard,” published in 1997, wrote roughly that the time had come for America to sit on the throne of global leadership, arguing that “the reach of American global power today is unique. The U.S. not only controls the oceans and seas but has developed military capability for amphibious control of coastlines that allows it to project its power into the interior of countries through specific political means…. America maintains and extends its hegemony by exploiting the latest discoveries in science and technology for military purposes, thereby creating a technologically unparalleled military regime, the only one with effective and global reach… all of this is further reinforced by American dominance in telecommunications, mass culture, and popular entertainment…”. American hegemonism in all its glory.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Mark Leonard comforts us with his book “Why Europe will dominate the 21st century,” arguing that US dominance is a temporary phenomenon, attributable to their military superiority and the strength of their pop culture, while their economic strength has begun to crumble. In contrast, “old” Europe excels in ideas and values that stand the test of time. “The European strategic doctrine is very different from the American one. Military power is needed to promote peace, not to display strength. Power may be necessary to defend European values, but it will never be the heart of European foreign policy. Soldiers are not meant to occupy other countries, but to remove the conditions that lead to war, in the first place. European military action above all changes the social fabric of war-torn societies.”
The “Smart Weapons” do not Win Peace
In this dialogue between Mars and Venus, more and more voices are being added: “Smart weapons may win wars, but they cannot win peace. In today’s complex and dangerous international environment, ‘soft forms of power,’ such as economic and developmental aid, technological support, trade, diplomacy, etc., contribute more effectively to addressing modern risks and threats. It is precisely at this level that the essential superiority of the European Union lies,” argues Professor P. Ioakeimidis (2003). This view is also adopted by the European Parliament, with the Morillon Report (2003), which refers to the broader concept of security, which includes political, economic, social, and intercultural initiatives for de-escalating and resolving conflicts.
It is a fact that the realist neoconservatives in the US believe that the current pacifist policy of the EU is a result of its weakness, the small military power it possesses, and the lack of a common foreign and security policy (that is why they made sure to undermine every effort in that direction). They also argue that when Europe was strong and had “great powers” and colonies, it did not talk about peace at all. Certainly, all of this may be true, but our friends overlook examining the consequences of power politics, as well as the lessons Europe has learned, and it seems that it has learned them well.
CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES IN EU-U.S. STRATEGIES
What changed radically since the Cold War years is America’s perception of foreign policy and international relations. The war in Iraq revealed in the clearest way the differences in philosophy and strategy among transatlantic partners. The years 2002 and 2003 were the most difficult. The new strategic doctrine revealed in September 2002 contained innovations that would create a rift between the US and its allies. Europe reacted to the issue of preemptive wars when it realized that it involved an attack not only against “private” individuals and non-state terrorist groups (which was not excessive), but also against states suspected of harboring and financing these groups. The emphasis, that is, which had been placed on deterrence since 1947 as a key element of strategy, had now shifted (Hoffman, 2003). The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, was to have very serious consequences for US strategy as well as for its relations with the EU.
The right of the USA to self-defense, as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, as well as the automatic provision of assistance from NATO, according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, has never been disputed by the EU. Moreover, the attack against the Taliban in Afghanistan was unanimously supported by the international community (resolutions 1373 and 1378). Disagreements arose from the moment the legitimate right of the USA ceased to be used for a specific event and turned into a permanent right, a kind of moral imperative for the USA, in the name of defending democracy, which places the USA de facto above International Law (Gnesotto, 2003). This notion is widespread in the USA and not only among government circles, that is, they find themselves in a state of continuous self-defense, justifying, according to Pierre Hassner (Le Monde, 24.6.2003), a regime of permanent exception from international legality. “We have been attacked. We don’t need a UN resolution to defend ourselves,” declared Paul Wolfowitz in February 2002, when the first signs of disagreements and the new orientations of the Bush administration began to emerge (ibid).
The “Axis of Evil” and Preventive Wars
It is a fact that after 9/11, when the first months of solidarity events towards Americans had passed, Europeans found themselves in a very difficult position when confronted with the new strategic priorities of the US – axis of evil, pre-emption, etc. According to the new doctrine, there are three main threats: 1/ terrorism 2/ proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 3/ rogue states and two perceptions that form the basis of American strategy: a/ pre-emptive strikes b/ regional changes. Recently, another threat was added, that of “tyranny,” the fight against which is supposed to become an obligation of the US from now on (Mazis, 2005).
The new strategy of the U.S. annoyed the Europeans, but also divided them, culminating in the war in Iraq, which split Europe into two camps, with the Greek Presidency desperately trying to reconcile the irreconcilable and prevent the worst outcomes. While Europeans and Americans do not have major differences regarding the type and nature of threats, and both recognize the dangers posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they have deep differences regarding the way and means of addressing these threats. Americans see the world as more dangerous, while Europeans see it as more complex. For the Europeans, international terrorism and the nuclear threat do not eliminate the risks of regional instability or humanitarian disaster, as was the case in the Balkans with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. To these risks, Europeans also add organized crime, epidemics, and failing states.
The New Dimensions of Security – The European Strategy
The Socialist Group of the European Parliament, in a document for “New Dimensions of Security” (2001), emphasizes that “in the post-Cold War period, the greatest threat to peace, democracy, and development comes from the terrifying inequalities and poverty in Third World countries. No military equipment, nor nuclear weapons, can provide security from this threat. You cannot shoot poverty – but poverty can shoot you.”
The European Security Strategy is centered on the philosophy of multilateralism and aims to strengthen transatlantic relations through a common assessment of new threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failing states, internationally organized crime, pandemics, poverty. The EU Strategy is described in the report of the High Representative Javier Solana adopted by the European Council in Brussels on 12.12.2003, adding another milestone to the evolutionary course of the ESDP, as initially defined in the Franco-British declaration of St. Malo (3-4 December 1998) and subsequently by the European Councils of Cologne (3-4 June 1999), Helsinki (10-11 December 1999), Gothenburg (15-16 June 2001), Thessaloniki (20 June 2003), and the Treaty for the Constitution, on 29 October 2004 in Rome.
The European Security Strategy, as first presented by Solana in Thessaloniki in 2003, does not make a distinction between terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the political-economic causes of terrorism: the gap between the rich and the poor, the long-standing regional conflicts particularly in the Middle East, and poor governance in many countries must be at the center of our attention. The concept of rogue state does not exist in European thinking, as it focuses on the dangers arising from failing states and poor governance. Furthermore, there is no agreement on the “axis of evil,” or on terrorism when defined as a unique phenomenon that appears the same all over the world. The European Strategy argues that there needs to be a distinction between the phenomenon of Al Qaeda and traditional forms of terrorism. At the heart of the European Security Strategy is the prevention of conflicts (and not preemptive wars). As Solana argues, “the threats we face are dynamic and if we let them grow, they will increase. If we wait for them to mature, we might wait a long time. We must be ready to act when the first signs of the problem appear.”
Similarities and Differences
Of course, the differences in strategy and perceptions between the EU and the US do not hinder convergences on a number of other issues concerning the international system. There is agreement in the assessment of Al Qaeda, Iran’s nuclear program, and North Korea. The concept of “prevention” (and not of a first strike) is also included in the European Security Strategy. Therefore, there are convergences that can form the basis for joint action. Joint action, of course, is not only imposed by the shared assessment of the nature of threats but also by the common values that generally unite the Western world—democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law—as well as common interests. However, the widening gap in military capability and the aggressiveness of the US causes nervousness and concern among Europeans. Correspondingly, the Americans often lose their patience and composure due to the nervousness and anxiety of the Europeans. Result: a vicious cycle.
David Compert argues that the hesitation and ambivalence of the Europeans result in the Americans not relying on their allies, nor considering their opinions when it comes to using military force. However, there is ambivalence on the other side as well. The Americans have two images of the Europeans: either they see them as insignificant because they do not possess military superiority like they do, or they see them as dangerous because they are well-organized and ambitious (Gnesotto). In other words, the good allies from one side consider the Europeans useless, while from the other side, they view them as competitors and a threat to their dominance. This ambivalent and indecisive stance has also expressed itself towards the European Defense Strategy, especially after 9/11, where they systematically assess the EU based on its military strength. In this area, the Americans follow the tactic of “divide and conquer.” On one hand, they strengthen the military capability of individual European countries, and on the other hand, when it comes to strengthening defense at the European level, they impose strict terms and conditions.
International terrorism does not unite.
Compert jokingly says that if you ask an American how they would like Europe to be, they will immediately respond with what Europe should do. It is a fact that Europe has ceased to be at the heart of American priorities for many reasons. First of all, the post-Cold War period shifted the focus of threats to other regions, outside the borders of the EU. Perhaps, has the time come to verify Kagan, Huntington, and Brzezinski, who speak of a shift of interest to Asia? Certainly, during the Cold War, transatlantic relations were dominated by the need to jointly confront the Soviet threat. This was the reason the United States remained in Europe as a regulatory power, mainly through NATO. With the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union disappeared, while international terrorism as a new common enemy seems to have almost the opposite effect of the Soviet threat during the Cold War (Yfantis, 2004).
However, despite forecasts, NATO has remained and continues to be regarded by many as the main security organization in the Western Hemisphere. This obsession has posed difficult problems for theorists. How does NATO continue to exist when, according to traditional theories of international politics, the basis for cooperation has disappeared? (Sjursen 2004). In any case, it is problematic to consider NATO as a community of liberal democratic values or as a “peaceful federation,” in the Kantian sense. This is not only because NATO lacks a democratic mandate but also because there is no international law that legitimizes it. Consequently, NATO may remain an organization that, at best, is governed according to the principles of multilateral cooperation and, at worst, bilateral cooperation (Sjursen).
The European Dream of the Professor from Maryland
In the EU, the rejection of the European Constitution by two founding members created an atmosphere of pessimism among those who believe in a strong Europe, capable of playing a positive and balancing role in today’s unipolar global system. The heavy atmosphere is further exacerbated by profound analyses like the one that came from the other side of the Atlantic.
The law professor Mr. Mortimer Sellers, in an article in VIMA (10.6.05), points out that “the ‘no’ can prove even worse for transatlantic relations. If the USA does not act quickly to strengthen its ties with Europe, the Western Alliance will begin to dissolve, creating again the conditions that led to the two world wars of the last century,” and continues, “it may seem utopian for someone to suggest greater political and commercial unity between the two sides of the Atlantic at a time when the rhetoric of mutual dislike is reaching new heights; yet it is precisely at such moments that institutionalized ties are needed most to prevent short-term self-interest from creating long-term alienation.” It is certain that the professor from Maryland’s observations will find quite a few willing recipients, at least among the hopelessly optimistic on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as among those who advocate that “no evil is purely devoid of good.” In the end, “The European Dream” of Jeremy Rifkin might just come true!…
CONCLUSIONS
- The fact that Euro-Atlantic relations have survived despite disagreements and tensions confirms the theory of interdependence in all areas, especially in the economy.
- The study of the history of Euro-Atlantic relations can help in predicting the future. The improvement of relations requires a common effort and continuous dialogue between the two sides, based on the existing points of convergence and shared assessment of global threats.
- The management of new global challenges, as well as the management of political and cultural differences (e.g. death penalty, International Criminal Court, Kyoto, etc.) should be part of the same process. The EU needs to leverage the experience it has in the method of persuasion and dialogue to create a common understanding.
- The EU-U.S. alliance is necessary, not only for security reasons but also because it constitutes the cohesive fabric of the Western world and a system of values based on freedom, peace, democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.
- The EU needs to strengthen the CSDP and move forward with the establishment of a European Security Council, in line with the proposals of Good Governance, by Asle Toje, (2004)
- The European Defense Doctrine should be made clearer and there should be better coordination of the resources allocated for defense by the member states. The greatest threat to the coherence and success of the ESDP remains the lack of sufficient available financial resources (European Parliament, Helmut Kuhne Report, 23.3.2005)
- The EU and the USA need, within the framework of the multilateral system, to strengthen the operation of international organizations, such as the OSCE, and to promote the reform of the UN in order to respond to the new needs of the 21st century.
- A stable relationship between the European Union and the USA is a necessary condition for global stability (Ioakeimidis).
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Word count: 9085
Anna Karamanou
17.06.2005