TO CONSENT: The Political Discourse in the Adjustment Period, 1981-89. The Case of PASOK

UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

SCHOOL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Master’s Program: “European and International Studies”

LESSON: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND GREECE

Professor: Susanna Verney

FOR CONSENT:

The Political Discourse in the Adjustment Period, 1981-89

The Case of PASOK

Anna Karamanou

May 2005

CONTENTS.

1. INTRODUCTION

2. DIFFERENT PHASES OF PASOK’S POLICY TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

1980-81 PRE-ELECTORAL PERIOD: From rejection to the “renegotiation” of accession

1981 – VICTORY OF CHANGE – CONTRACT WITH THE PEOPLE – “Referendum” and “special agreement” with EEC

The First Negotiation of the Mandate (26.10.1981) – Proposals of PASOK

Participation of A. Papandreou in the European Council, London 26-27/11/81-

1982 – THE MEMORANDUM – Positions of the Government on Greece’s Relations with the European Communities

1983 – THE MEDITERRANEAN INTEGRATED PROGRAMS (MIP)
The First Greek Presidency – Second half of 1983
1984 – SPINELLI PLAN, for European Integration – Abstention of PASOK
CONFERENCE PASOK – May 1984. The Prospect of a United Europe
1985 – NEW ELECTORAL VICTORY OF PASOK – Intergovernmental Conference for the Revision of the Treaty
Expansion of the Community with Spain and Portugal – Ratification of the Treaty by the Greek Parliament, 4.11.1985.
1986-Intervention (Memorandum), for the enhancement of Economic and Social Cohesion

1987 – RECONCILIATION AND CONSENT – Internal Market (Delors package) – The discussion in the Greek Parliament

1988 – Equal citizens in Europe
1989 – Common course

3. THE ANATOMY OF THE EEC ISSUE IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF PASOK

The Political Climate of the Metapolitefsi – the Demand for Change
The Role of the Political Leader Andreas Papandreou
From the Hard Euroscepticism of the 1970s to the Pre-Electoral Period and the Prospect of Victory in 1981
1981- The Third Way- Greece to the Greeks and the People in Power

National Independence, National Popular Unity, and Dependency Theory

The Mild Euroscepticism of the First Four-Year Term 1981-85 and the Theory of the North-South Opposition

The First Two Years of Change – Proud Foreign Policy – New Relationship with EEC, USA, NATO, TURKEY

THE GREEK ECONOMY, THE EEC AND MORAVCSIK’S RATIONALISM OF PASOK

The Intergovernmental Theory and the Spinelli Plan

PASOK AND THE THEORY OF POLITICALLY DETERMINED ECONOMIC CYCLE – 1985, The Beginning of the Second Government Term

The CONSENT for the Internal Market (Delors package) and European Integration – from Intergovernmentalism to Federalism

4. BASIC ARGUMENTS FOR THE CHANGE OF THE STANCE OF PASOK TOWARDS THE EEC

5. The IMAGE OF THE EEC IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF PASOK or THE MILKING OF THE COW

6. CONCLUSIONS

FOR CONSENT:

The Political Discourse in the Adjustment Period, 1981-89

The Case of PASOK

Anna Karamanou

J. INTRODUCTION

The accession to the Community was one of the central themes of the political confrontation in Greece immediately after the fall of the junta and the restoration of parliamentary democracy. The political rhetoric of the newly established PASOK began with a complete rejection of the country’s European perspective and with a fierce confrontation against the New Democracy party, which had the initiative on this issue. However, later, towards the end of the 1970s, with the prospect of assuming governmental responsibilities appearing, PASOK shifted to a lower tone and made proposals for the renegotiation of the accession agreement initially, and subsequently for a “special agreement,” “referendum” that was never carried out, “memorandum”, “special relationship,” and finally full “consensus” in 1987 for the Single Act and the program for the completion of the Internal Market.

The accession of Greece to the European Community took place on January 1, 1981, during a period of economic recession for the Community and significant structural problems for the Greek economy. Within this negative context, Greece had to expose its fragile economic structure to international competition. The negative results caused by these new conditions (mainly the trade balance deficit) confirmed at least some initial reservations of those who viewed the prospect of Greece’s accession to the Community negatively. The government of Andreas Papandreou, which emerged from the elections of October ¹⁸, 1981, inherited an economy in a state of stagflation, with negative growth rates (-0.4%), inflation of +24.5%, and fiscal deficits at 9.1% of GDP. (Kazakos, 2001). PASOK, as the government, faced with problems but also with the obligation to participate in European institutions, soon abandoned its anti-European rhetoric and directed its interest towards leveraging the new opportunities offered by accession to the EEC.

The subject of the following analysis is the confirmation or denial, for the period under examination, of the working hypothesis of Taggart & Szczerbiak, according to which Euroskepticism is a characteristic of opposition parties and not of governing parties.

In the first part, I will present in chronological order the different phases that the PASOK party went through regarding European integration, as revealed by the statements and speeches of the president of PASOK, Andreas Papandreou, and other officials. In the second part, I will attempt an anatomy of the issue of the EEC through the political discourse and the changes in the party’s political line. In the third part, I will analyze the arguments based on which PASOK supports its policies and justifies the change in its stance.

2. DIFFERENT PHASES OF PASOK’S POLICY TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

1980-81 PRE-ELECTORAL PERIOD: From rejection to the renegotiation of accession

With the prospect of victory in the 1981 elections in sight, PASOK gradually abandoned its hardline stance towards the EEC. At the International Scientific Seminar titled “Transition to Socialism,” held in Athens in the summer of 1980, it essentially proposed the renegotiation of the terms of accession. Yannis Papantoniou, in his speech, declared that “the accession to the EEC was a huge economic mistake, which may cost the country dearly. Therefore, it is urgent to start negotiations with the Community regarding the modification of the status of trade relations…”, while Th. Pangalos emphasized: “We could potentially abolish the most burdensome of the commitments imposed on us by our accession to the EEC or even leave the EEC, if the Greek people decide so.”

1981- VICTORY OF CHANGE – CONTRACT WITH THE PEOPLE – Referendum and special agreement with EEC

The issue of the EEC occupied a central position in the “Contract with the People,” that is, in the electoral program of PASOK. Among other things: “Joining entails the transfer of national sovereignty to foreign centers, on critical issues… and for this reason, PASOK proposes a referendum and the conclusion of a special agreement.” However, “the referendum belongs to the privileges of the President of the Republic.”

The First Negotiation of the Mandate, 26.10.1981 – Programmatic Statements of PASOK

The PASOK government decided not to seek withdrawal from the EEC (the cost would have been high), but rather to improve the terms of Greece’s membership and to exert influence on the formation of policy and decision-making within the Community. The first official “comprehensive position” of the PASOK government regarding the negotiation of the Mandate (and the Community as a whole) was made one week after the elections, on October 26, 1981, at the Council of General Affairs, by the then Deputy Foreign Minister Asimakis Fotilas. The document presented was very important because it clearly outlined not only the problems facing the Greek economy but also included proposals for the Community’s policy, “in order to bridge interregional inequalities and to strengthen the Southern countries of Europe.” (Ioakeimidis, 1988).

The programmatic statements of the new Government of PASOK, on November 22, 1981, moved in the same framework.

Participation of Papandreou in the European Council, London 26.11.1981

Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, with his intervention, made a comprehensive statement regarding the restructuring of the Community and the future position of Greece, clarifying that, until a final decision is made on the referendum, Greece will work within the institutions of the Community to present its requests and positions.

1982, THE MEMORANDUM – Positions on the Relations of Greece with the European Community

In March 1982, the Greek Government submitted a “memorandum” through which the strategy towards the Community is clarified. The “Greek particularity” is highlighted, aiming to improve the country’s position within the European framework, as well as to transform the Community itself. With the memorandum, “the Greek Government is ready to jointly examine with the Community the possibility of finding special arrangements that can be reconciled with our development policy and support it.”

1983 – MEDITERRANEAN INTEGRATED PROGRAMS (MIP)

The European Commission responded to the Greek memorandum in March 1983, noting that “the uniqueness of the Mediterranean problems is a fact recognized by the Community.” In its response, the European Commission indeed linked the fulfillment of the memorandum’s requests with the adoption of the MED programs. Specifically, the Commission pointed out that “in the case of Greece, the Community action is aimed to be more extensive and more intensive than in other Mediterranean regions of the Community” (Ioakeimidis 1988).

The First Greek Presidency – 1983, second half

The negotiation based on the memorandum was incorporated, during the Greek Presidency, into the broader process of restructuring the Community that had started with the Declaration of the European Council of Stuttgart (1983).

1984- SPINELLI PLAN for European Integration- PASOK Abstention

The European Parliament on February 14, 1984 voted in favor of the “Draft Treaty for the establishment of the European Union.” The initiative for drafting the proposal belonged to Altiero Spinelli, an Italian MEP from the left and an advocate for the federalization of the Community. Historically, the Draft represents the first comprehensive treaty text with provisions covering both the economic and political aspects of European integration. The draft was supported by members from all political groups and received 237 votes in favor, 31 against, and 43 abstentions. Among those who abstained from the vote were the MEPs of PASOK.

PASOK CONFERENCE, May 1984 – The Prospect of a United Europe

The first conference of PASOK took place on May 10, 1984, just a few weeks before the European elections. In his speech, the President of PASOK extensively addressed the Community in a positive way. One of the most impressive points of his speech is his reference to the prospect of a United Europe and to the abolition of the division into West and East.

1985 – New Electoral Victory of PASOK – Intergovernmental Conference for the Amendment of the Treaty

PASOK won comfortably the second term in the parliamentary elections of June 2, 1985. A few days later, in Milan, it opposed together with Britain and Denmark the proposal for the convening of an intergovernmental conference for the revision of the Treaty. The reaction mainly concerned the limitation of unanimity in decision-making. However, Greece and the other countries that disagreed actively participated in all revision processes. Speaking at the Intergovernmental Conference in October 1985, Th. Pangalos, as Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that, “the Greek Government, despite its fundamental reservations, comes to the intergovernmental conference with the political will to maintain a constructive stance…”

Expansion of the Community with Spain and Portugal – Ratification of the Treaty by the Greek Parliament, 4.11.1985.

The atmosphere that prevailed in the Parliament during the discussion for the ratification of the accession treaty of Spain and Portugal is reflected in the intervention of Maria Damanaki. “… PASOK and New Democracy together applaud today’s bill and sound the joyful messages of the Enlargement of the European Economic Community. This is an alliance that does not seem at all unnatural. This alliance seems completely natural… and here I want to emphasize from the beginning that this stance of PASOK contrasts with what the Prime Minister himself has said justifying the country’s stay in the EEC. Mr. Prime Minister acknowledges that there are negative consequences from the country’s stay in the EEC, acknowledges that the overall balance is negative, but says that the cost of disengagement is very high…”

1986 – Intervention for the strengthening of Economic and Social Cohesion

The Greek government, in a memorandum, points out that interregional inequalities have not decreased in recent years and emphasizes: “The enlargement of the Community with the accession of Spain and Portugal almost doubles the area of regions where GDP per capita is less than 60% of the average Community GDP.”

1987 – THE CONSENT for Internal Market (Delors Package) – The discussion in the Greek Parliament

PASOK fully supported the program for the Single Internal Market as formulated by Jacques Delors. The discussion in the Greek Parliament (14.1.1987) was one of the most interesting and extensive on European issues and the country’s relations with the EEC. A very characteristic example of PASOK’s change in direction was the intervention of Theodoros Pangalos, who began by saying: “Mr. President, I do not want to pretend to be Nasreddin Hodja, especially when I am here to propose further integration of the country into Europe and further distancing from the East.” A few months later, during the parliamentary session for the ratification of the protocols for the EEC agreements with countries of Eastern and Southern Mediterranean (11.6.87), he emphasized: “I believe that, when history judges Mr. Karamanlis, it will undoubtedly approve of his ideas and initiatives for European unification.”

1988 – Equal citizens in Europe

This was the title of the speech by the Deputy Minister of Education George Papandreou at the meeting of European socialists in Paris, in February 1988, who among other things said: “As socialists, we want a human-centered society. For this reason, we welcome the decisions of Brussels at the last Summit, decisions that, alongside the unification of the market, promote social solidarity, the convergence of economies, and the rights of the small.”

1989 – Common course of PASOK with the European Community

The common course is now explicitly stated in the “Program of the Third Four-Year Period,” with the paragraph: “our course is influenced by the pressing need for democratic modernization and by the common course with other European countries.”

3. THE ANATOMY OF THE EEC ISSUE IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF PASOK

The Political Climate of the Metapolitefsi – the Demand for Change

The political discourse of PASOK should be evaluated based on the prevailing conditions, the political climate, and the expectations of the examined period, both domestically and internationally. European pessimism during the early years of adjustment and the Greek political culture are key elements for understanding PASOK’s positions as well as for its political success. During the post-Junta period, the demands of specific groups multiplied, along with the demand for democracy and the country’s liberation from foreign interests. PASOK presented itself as the guarantor of these popular demands. The demand for change was combined with the expectation of satisfying every group and punishing those who were presented as the enemies of the people (Lyrintzis, 1990). As Nikos Demertzis (1990) argues, the Greek political culture of the ’80s was characterized by the interplay and mediation of elements from the distant and recent past with modern and contemporary elements. The vibrant political culture of the ’80s distilled frameworks of political knowledge, perception, and action spanning at least two centuries of history.

PASOK won the elections in a climate of polarization with the “Right,” with a radical political discourse, a program of radical social and economic reform, and the promise of achieving substantial national independence. Based on dependency theories, which were very popular in the 1970s, PASOK aimed on one hand to disengage the country from foreign dependence and on the other hand to redistribute wealth and promote social justice.

Two months after the electoral victory of PASOK, Konstantinos Tsoukalas wrote that “the results of the 1981 elections could indicate a serious change in the ‘topological’ structure of the political forces in the country. The extraordinary speed of PASOK’s rise can only be attributed to a crisis of representation, a crisis that has existed since the end of the Second World War. For the first time in the post-war political history of the country, power is assumed by a party that advocates for radical political and social changes and that portends a decisive rupture with the traditional system of established authority.”

The Role of the Political Leader Andreas Papandreou

Andreas Papandreou is undoubtedly the type of charismatic political leader with the advantages and disadvantages of this concept. He generates collective passion and is a producer of ideas and politics. What may have been in 1974 the volition of an ambitious and dynamic leader proves to express a deeper need of the Greek reality, which is why it soon becomes an emerging majority current and power. And the mere fact that a party like PASOK assumes power democratically and smoothly constituted a political break, a burial of the anomalies of the past, a validation and enlargement of the democratic advancement of ’74. Therefore, the rise of PASOK itself has positive multiplicative effects and creates an atmosphere of euphoria and vindication (Androulakis 1992).

The party’s policy on major issues was almost exclusively regulated by Andreas Papandreou himself, usually bypassing all party organs and communicating directly with the people and the media. This explains why, before and after 1981, Papandreou’s speeches became the subject of political analysis for those seeking to find subtle differences that would indicate changes in policy regarding the EEC (Verney 1996).

Key words in the political discourse of PASOK: national independence, popular sovereignty, socialist transformation, EEC, special relationship, NATO, Brussels Directorate, West, USA, bases, foreign dependence, North-South opposition, capitalist system, periphery, uneven development, monopolies, Right, foreign capital, proud foreign policy, national popular unity, sovereign people, non-privileged, social liberation, self-sufficient development, Greece to the Greeks.

From the Hard Euroscepticism of the 1970s to the Pre-Electoral Period and the Prospect of Victory in 1981

The issue of the EEC in the political discourse of PASOK, during the period of hard euroskepticism (1974-81), is primarily presented as a political issue that jeopardizes national independence. PASOK declared that “our country does not need complete integration with the international capitalist system for its laws to become even more relentless. PASOK rejects membership, just as it rejects membership with conditions. There is no path that leads, through dependency, to autonomy” (EG announcement – 1.3.1976). The EEC, therefore, is equated with foreign decision-making centers that seek subservience and the strengthening of the country’s dependency.

Two and a half years later, in a speech in Heraklion, Crete (17.10.1979), as the leader of the main opposition, Andreas Papandreou continues the rhetoric about the calamities that await the country if it ties itself to the chariot of the West: “With the inclusion of our country in the EEC, with the return to the military wing of NATO, with the signing of the Greek-American agreement for the bases—if all of this takes place—the military, political, and economic dependence of our country on Washington and Brussels will be completed. Then Greece will be integrated into the West, as a province of the EEC and a satellite of NATO and the USA.” During this period, despite the rise of PASOK as the main opposition, Papandreou has not yet abandoned the hard anti-Western nationalist rhetoric. This will happen during his election campaign, ahead of the elections and the polls of 1981.

Andreas Papandreou at that time had completely separated his position from European social democracy and argued that PASOK is a socialist party and not a social democratic one. “And this is because, within the framework of social democratic thought, the marginal reforms that take place where labor and social democratic parties govern merely change and modernize the form of capitalism. However, they do not fundamentally affect its basic structure.” It is worth noting that at the Seminar, which took place a year before the rise of PASOK to power, on the topic “Transition to Socialism,” no representative of a European social-democratic party participated, while the following individuals took part with their presentations: Samir Amin, Director of Research for the Future of Africa (Senegal), St. Babanas, Professor of Economics at the Technical University of Budapest, Balsa Spanticier, Professor of Political Science at the University of Belgrade, Mousab Al Rawy of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party of Iraq, etc. PASOK was in search of the “Third Way” to Socialism….

1981 – The “Third Road” – Greece to the Greeks and the People in Power

A few months after the country’s accession to the Community and in close proximity to the electoral contest, in a speech in Alexandroupoli (16.5.1981), Andreas Papandreou proclaimed: “And what about the paradise of the EEC? The vision of New Democracy has already turned to ashes in the eyes of the Greek people. Farmers have learned what it means to join the EEC. They know it from the cemeteries of their products, from the price increases that barely cover 1/3 of inflation. Craftsmen and merchants have learned what it means to join the EEC from the relentless assault of monopolies and supermarkets. Housewives have learned it from the astronomical price increases of almost all the products they buy. And Greek industrialists are already learning it, facing the unequal competition of foreign capital. That is why the position of PASOK remains unwavering. Tomorrow” referendum Today there are struggles within the bodies of the Hellenic Basketball Federation to minimize the negative impacts on our country’s economy.”

Andreas Papandreou closed his speech as follows: “With the rallying of the Greek people at the grassroots level, within the framework of NATIONAL POPULAR UNITY, PASOK will fight to finally oust the Right from power. It will fight and it will WIN. So that the people will be SOVEREIGN, so that the course of our country will be NATIONALLY PROUD and SOCIALLY JUST. So that GREECE belongs to the GREEKS.”

It is clear that Papandreou’s goal is to rally broad segments of the electorate around PASOK, all the “non-privileged.” He attempts to embrace farmers, who represent a dynamic and at the same time particularly oppressed segment of Greek society, “the most wronged class in the country,” as he states, artisans, also an important category, housewives (broadly interpreted as 51% of the electorate), as well as industrialists! The EEC is blamed for all the evils of the Greek economy. He uses strong symbolism aimed at shocking his audience and posing dilemmas. The EEC is presented as a hell filled with graveyards of Greek products. European companies are depicted as an army of monopolies that ruthlessly fight against Greek artisans, with housewives at the mercy of astronomical price increases. The discourse is strongly anti-rightist, introspective, nationalistic, and messianic. It aims to identify PASOK’s victory in the elections with the victory of the people and of Greece. However, this discourse receives approval and adoration from voters.

The pluralistic PASOK is fighting to win the hearts of all those who have reasons to fear the competition that comes with a space of free transactions. Papandreou knows very well the art of politically responding to the anxiety of ordinary people in front of the terra incognita of the EEC as well as their ignorance regarding critical internal political issues. Of course, he himself, having fully adopted the theories of dependency and the logic of the “Third Way to Socialism,” is deeply convinced that Greece must chart its own national path of “self-sufficient economic and political development.” However, he has already accepted that this battle will be fought “within the institutions of the EEC.” He has, that is, recognized the reality of accession; he does not go to the elections with the slogan “out of the EEC,” but proposes that the people decide through a “referendum.” PASOK, therefore, is transforming into a neutral recipient of whatever decision the people make, if and when a referendum is decided by the President of the Republic.

National Independence, National Popular Unity and the Theory of Dependence

The political discourse of PASOK primarily focuses on the issue of national independence and the autonomy of the country in relation to foreign decision-making centers. PASOK’s commitment to the formulation of “self-sufficient economic and social development” and the slogan “Greece to the Greeks” resonate particularly with the average Greek voter, who experienced the seven-year deviation from the democratic regime as foreign intervention that interrupted the economic and social development of Greece. The theory of dependence served as the central axis of PASOK’s politics. According to this, Greece, as a country of the periphery of capitalism, should shake off the imperialist yoke and not establish relations with the metropolitan centers of Western Europe (Verney, 1990).

In the pre-election speeches of Andreas Papandreou, the EEC, NATO, Washington, Brussels, and the West constitute the hostile forces aimed at the military, political, and economic dependence of Greece and its incorporation into the West, either as a subordinate to the EEC or as a satellite of NATO and the USA. Therefore, if Greece wants to develop and become a country with dignity and national independence, it must remain outside the EEC. According to the theory, the invocation of real or imaginary national threats leads to mobilization and unity. This theory, enriched with many elements of “patriotism,” was fully utilized by PASOK, with the adoption of “National Popular Unity,” which formed the basis of its strategy for ascending to power.

The EEC, therefore, in the political discourse of PASOK, is presented as a bloc of forces that undermine and are hostile to the Greek identity and self-determination. For PASOK, the EEC is identified with the capitalist metropolis, with the junior partner of the USA. Consequently, it argued, the accession would tie the country even more closely to the chariot of the USA, in order to better serve the imperialist machinations against Cyprus and Greek rights in the Aegean (Verney, 1989).

Here, the popular “theory of an international conspiracy” against Greece is also involved, or the well-known folk myth: Little Greece (the Little Red Riding Hood) that is in danger of being devoured by the EEC (the Big Bad Wolf). This theory has been particularly favored by the Church of Greece, which has always viewed integration into the EEC and the free market as a threat to national identity and, of course, to its own monopolistic status, since, as Max Weber argues, the Church is an organization that claims the monopoly of the goods of salvation.

The Mild Euroscepticism of the First Four-Year Term 1981-85 and the Theory of the North-South Opposition

The rise of PASOK to power is followed by a period of mild Euroscepticism during the first four years. In its political discourse, many of the key phrases from the pre-election period survive; however, just a month after coming to power and participating in European institutions, PASOK discovers: a/ the economic dimension of the Community, that is, the ability to absorb resources and bolster the Greek economy from the Community budget, b/ that Greece, “the small country of the periphery,” can influence the shaping and decision-making processes, c/ that there are cultural ties that unite European countries, d/ that Greece’s international standing and foreign policy are being strengthened, and e/ that the vision of a united Europe is achievable. However, the political dimension of the Community (demystified) will be recognized and fully adopted later, towards the end of the second four-year term, with the Single Act and the program for the completion of the internal market.

During the reading of the government’s program statements on November 22, 1981, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, speaking about Greece’s international relations, emphasizes: “In the European area, we orient our foreign policy based on the principle that Europe is united, that close cooperation between European countries is imposed by our common cultural past and by common economic and social interests, and that the vision should not be the creation of a new superpower, but a Europe of workers.”It should be noted that for the same positions two years earlier, Kostas Simitis had been expelled from the Executive Office. The programmatic statements of the new government insisted on holding a referendum. “to let the people decide on this serious issue,” however at the same time it referred the decision for its conduct to the“privileges of the President of the Republic”that is, to Konstantinos Karamanlis, the Prime Minister of the connection with the EEC (1962) and of the accession (1981). It is evident that Papandreou does not wish to withdraw from the Community.

At the European Council in London, a month after the electoral victory of 1981, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou spoke about the restructuring of the Community and the future position of Greece. In this Council, in brief, Greece’s position in the Community was initially outlined: the pursuit of a special status, within the broader context of the more radical restructuring of the relationships between the European North and South (Ioakeimidis, 1988).

The theoretical analysis of North-South and regional inequalities was prominently present in the Prime Minister’s speech: “…Our party and now our government has always been convinced that the rules established for the nine could perhaps function well for the industrially developed economies of Northern Europe. But they certainly did not fit the regional countries of Southern Europe, which have not yet reached the stage of capitalist maturity. For these countries, which include Greece and tomorrow Spain and Portugal, these rules were burdensome and could easily stifle a self-sufficient type of economic development.” The contrast between North and South remains pervasive in all speeches and analyses. As Andreas Papandreou argues, “the contrast between North and South is fundamental and ever-present since it is externalized in all international organizations.”

The first days of the new PASOK government are characterized by a clear trend of redefining Greece’s position within the international system and by the ambition to assume a leadership role in international developments. This trend will be confirmed three years later with Andreas Papandreou’s participation in the “Group of 6” for international recession and peace.

The First Two Years of Change – Proud Foreign Policy – New Relationship with EEC, USA, NATO, TURKEY

Two years after the electoral victory of PASOK, in a party pamphlet, for “The first 2 Years of Change” it is emphasized: “The issues concerning national independence are no longer a subject of negotiation with third countries, whatever they may be. The socialist government of Greece decides on its relations with other countries having as its main concern the serving of the interests of the people, that is, the real national interests. This principle governs the country’s relations with the USA, the EEC, NATO, Turkey, the socialist countries.” Regarding defense, PASOK’s emphasis is also on the “independent” and on the «national». As the same leaflet says “With the support of the unity of the people and the army, the government, within two years, laid the foundations of a National Defense Policy that effectively shields our homeland against any foreign threat and secures peace.”

The summer of 1983 was marked by the signing of the agreement for the removal of American bases from Greece. As Andreas Papandreou emphasized at the ^10thCongress of the Central Committee (September 1983), “this landmark governmental act sealed the end of an era of dependence,” and at another point in his speech, “The main pillars of our effort in the first phase were the proud, multifaceted foreign policy and the defensive fortification of the country.”

The rhetoric of PASOK clearly attempts to justify the political priority it placed on “independence” and “proud foreign policy.” Two years later, it claims that it laid the foundations of this policy and fortified Greece against any foreign threats. Therefore, the government of Greece now has control over its relations with third countries and, of course, with the EEC, thus the EEC ceases to be the dangerous opponent seeking the enslavement of the country, and therefore national independence and sovereignty are not at stake.

Public opinion remained very cautious until around the mid-1980s. According to Eurobarometer, in the autumn of 1981, only 38% of Greeks believed that the EEC was something “good.” The same level of support was recorded in the spring of 1984. However, in the autumn of 1987, the percentage rose to 58% with a trend of further increase (Featherstone 1994). This shift in public opinion coincided with the agreement on the CAP and the regional policy of economic and social cohesion, which benefited Greece greatly. This coincidence led many to claim that the funds were the reason for the change in the stance of PASOK, as well as of public opinion.

THE GREEK ECONOMY, THE PRESIDENCY AND MORAVCSIK’S RATIONALITY OF PASOK

After taking power, PASOK, having realized from its participation in European institutions that there were many opportunities for claim and negotiation, ceased to view the EEC as an external threat and began to see it primarily as a community of economic interests from which it could draw funds for development. It focused its opposition on the European Political Cooperation, which it considered a mechanism for imposing the positions of the Great on the Small and a framework that restricted the capabilities of member states for autonomous international roles. According to a characteristic formulation by Andreas Papandreou in a speech to the members of the Presidency of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, “united Western Europe cannot start from an agreement on Political Cooperation, but from the development of a genuine common economic foundation” (Valinakis, 1989).

During the Greek Presidency (second semester of 1983), at the ^10thCongress of the Central Committee (September 1983), Andreas Papandreou emphasized: “The transition to socialism is implemented through a series of structural and institutional changes that radically alter the existing processes of production and distribution of our national income.” What we find positive in the Presidency is that we are given the opportunity to promote policies that could change the character, to some extent, of the Community. Undoubtedly, today the Community is a customs union, plus a common agricultural policy. The only policy that is common is the agricultural. The characteristics that give it a certain character that primarily interests countries—not developed to the extent that the major countries of the West are—such as Greece, are the various funds, social, regional, etc., which, if they indeed had significant resources, would allow for a redistribution, essentially of income, which would enable countries with a slower pace of development—the second speed with a lower standard of living—to bridge the gap. It is evident that the focus is on funds, compensatory benefits, resource redistribution, and the reduction of inequalities.

In the presentation of the Presidency’s program at the European Parliament (July 5, 1983), Foreign Minister Yiannis Charalambopoulos placed special emphasis on the “new momentum” of the Community, which mainly involves the significant increase in Community resources for financing new policies in the areas of research, technology, and industry, as well as cohesive structural policies. The “new momentum” therefore meant for the Greek Presidency the development of the Community into a new model that would incorporate policies for the recovery of the Community economy, addressing the competitive challenge from the USA and Japan, as well as structural policies for reducing inter-regional inequalities.

The decisions of the European Council of Fontainebleau (June 1984) concerned the commitment to the application of the CAP from 1985. In his speech, Andreas Papandreou once again reminded the partners of the uniqueness of Greece and the problems of the Greek Economy. “You may know that the consequences of my country’s accession to the Community have been adverse for almost all sectors of the economy. Greece, a small regional country, with particular developmental problems, was ‘invited’ to participate in the integration process mainly of wealthy countries under terms of accession that, in our opinion, correspond to the conditions and demands of a dynamic development policy. We criticized the terms of accession and requested to change the situation by submitting the Memorandum – without proceeding with a request for a revision of the terms of the Accession Act, as other countries have done in the past.” Andreas Papandreou publicly acknowledges the change in his policy towards the EEC, even though the terms of Greece’s accession were disadvantageous. However, he does not demand a revision of the terms of accession, but rather changes and improvements. Instead of revision, issues of national economic interest are being promoted, which will benefit the “small regional country with particular development problems.”

This policy of PASOK validates Moravcsik’s theory of international relations, according to which states in the international arena act rationally guided by national interests. This model of rational state behavior, based on internal interests, assumes that international conflict and cooperation can be depicted as a process that unfolds in two successive stages: governments first identify their interests and then negotiate to fulfill them. Metaphorically, these two stages determine the demand and supply in international relations. In this case, PASOK’s domestic policy defined the national interests and the benefits that could arise from participation in the EEC (demand), while a series of intergovernmental maneuvers and negotiations would determine the political responses of the EEC system to the pressures (supply).

The Intergovernmental Theory and the Spinelli Plan

The intergovernmental theory, according to Moravcsik, attempts to interpret the Community as the result of strategies adopted by rational governments, which act based on their own priorities and the power they possess. The major historical decisions that shaped the agenda of the European Community and formed common policies were the result of intergovernmental negotiations and, like many international negotiations, the decisions of the Community can be viewed as a coordination game with redistributive consequences (Sebenious, 1991, Krasner, 1991, Garrett, 1992, in “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, Moravcsik, 1993).

The PASOK government recognized in time that, according to theory, European institutions strengthen governments, even of small states, in two ways. First, they increase the effectiveness of interstate consultation, within a common negotiating forum, common decision-making processes, and implementation control that reduce costs and facilitate cooperation agreements. Second, European institutions enhance the autonomy of national political leaderships against specific social groups within states by invoking common policies. National governments enlist European institutions in a “two-level” strategy, aimed at successfully addressing pressures within their countries (Putnam, 1998). The analysis of the two-level game largely explains PASOK’s choice, on the one hand to adopt an aggressive negotiating tactic at the level of the EEC, based on national preferences and common rules, and on the other hand to maintain within the country its rhetoric about national independence, self-sufficient development, and a third way to socialism.

In the context of this policy, PASOK insisted on maintaining unanimity and avoiding the creation of a Europe of two speeds. In the discussion on the Spinelli Plan in the European Parliament, very characteristic of its positions was the speech of PASOK MEP Spyros Plaskovitis, who, summarizing PASOK’s disagreements and fears regarding European integration, emphasized : “In Article 82, the Europe of two speeds makes its official appearance, while the dominance of the large and industrially developed countries of the Community over the periphery is consolidated through the complex decision-making processes, where the principle of unanimity is abandoned even when it comes to vital national interests.” and he concluded his speech by emphasizing: “We, the socialists of PASOK, will continue to abstain from futile and dangerous votes, like this one, which could involve our country in new obligations and impose on us to abandon elements of our democratic constitution and the independence of the foreign policy of our socialist government.” (Proceedings of the European Parliament, 14.2.’84).

These positions were abandoned when discussions began on the Single Act and the Community’s regional policy.

PASOK AND THE THEORY OF POLITICALLY DEFINED ECONOMIC CYCLE – Second Government Term

According to A. Downs’ theory, governments tend to manipulate national economies in a way that increases their chances of reelection. In this pursuit, governments essentially surpass the limits of economic logic and data. With a time lag, this inevitably leads to accelerating inflation, which is addressed (after the elections) with painful restrictive policy measures. Thus, this predictable “policy pattern” (W. Nordhaus) during a governance period begins with austerity in the early years and ends with an artificial and therefore fragile economic prosperity. Governments, also, precisely because they seek to control the economic cycle, worsen the long-term problems of unemployment and inflation. (Kazakos, 1990).

During the first four years, the institutional framework for the “socialist transformation” was defined by three key pieces of legislation: socializations, supervisory councils, and the law for the economic restructuring of enterprises. In the same period, demands for more social justice and for the improvement of low incomes were met. In the reading of the programmatic statements of the new PASOK government, which emerged from the elections of June 2, 1985, Andreas Papandreou stated the following: “The assurance of an autonomous path and the promotion of convergence are the determining criteria of our relations with the EEC. In this spirit, we successfully negotiated the recognition of the uniqueness of our Country with the Greek Memorandum, as well as the linkage of the implementation of the Operational Programs with the expansion of the Community.” The noteworthy point in this case is that the satisfaction of Greek demands and the approval of the MOP were linked to Greece’s “veto” threat against the Community’s enlargement with Spain and Portugal.

In October 1985, the government proceeded with economic policy measures and a stabilization program. In a speech, the Minister of National Economy Kostas Simitis (12.10.1985) pointed out: “Development and economic progress require a stable economic foundation; they require mechanisms that ensure the continuous improvement of economic results in productivity and competitiveness. Development presupposes that we create and invest the surplus of our work. It presupposes that we produce more than we consume. However, this is not happening.”

Costas Simitis, while as Minister of Agriculture during the first term of PASOK followed a corporatist policy – certainly not a modernizing one – from 1985, when the populist economic policy of PASOK was exhausted, Simitis evolved into a widely recognized authentic supporter of modernization (Caramanis, 1999). It is clear that the government abandoned the uncritical adoption of syndicalist demands in favor of “development,” “stability,” “productivity,” and “competitiveness” – key words in the vocabulary of the Community and of Costas Simitis, in light of the liberalization of the market with the Single Act. However, two years later, the needs of the pre-election period led to the abandonment of the stabilization policy and the adoption of the political line of “Tsovolas, give it all,” confirming the theory of the politically determined economic cycle.

It is a fact that the redistributive economic policy of PASOK contributed to the social inclusion and political emancipation of marginalized groups. The annual expenditure for social policy increased from 14% under New Democracy (1975-81) to 20% under PASOK (1982-89) (Kazakos 1988). However, this policy (with the exception of the years 1985-87) had a significant cost for the national economy and brought great difficulties in Greece’s effort to converge economically with the other countries of the Community in the 1990s (Nikos Mouzelis & George Pagoulatos, 2002).

From Governance to Federalism – The Consensus for the Internal Market (Delors package) and European Integration

The program for the single internal market, as formulated in 1985, was largely a result of the increasing emphasis placed on macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal stability, after several years of large deficits. The Commission, led by Jacques Delors, insisted on the connection between the single internal market and redistribution. This connection was achieved, thanks to the inclusion of the chapter on economic and social cohesion in the Single European Act and even more so thanks to the role of the Structural Funds (Tsoukalas, 2004).

The discussion in the Hellenic Parliament (14.1.1987) was one of the most interesting and extensive on European matters in general. The majority spokesperson, Iosif Michelogiannis, explained to the body that: “At first, the Greek Government did not agree with the Single Act because we had a limited text that did not cover the interests of the less developed countries within the EEC. However, after the convening of the intergovernmental conference and the struggle of the Greek Government, we have a series of proposals that were accepted and included in the text of the Single Act.”

A few months later, in a speech at the European Council in Brussels (29-30.6.87), Andreas Papandreou emphasized: “We are facing a creative political challenge—the challenge of building Europe of 2000, the challenge of transforming our societies and economies so that they absorb and creatively utilize new technologies and scientific possibilities in order to maximize prosperity and upgrade the quality of life for all segments of the population,” while in Copenhagen (4-5.12.87), regarding the reform of the CAP, he consented by saying :”Greece is following the significant changes taking place in agricultural production and consumption patterns, both in the European context and in the broader international arena, and recognizes the necessity of reforming and adapting the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to the new conditions that have already been established. However, under no circumstances should the reform lead to the re-nationalization of the policy or undermine the family model of agriculture within the community area.”

During the second government term, the positions of PASOK towards the Community increasingly took on consensual characteristics. Particularly from 1988 onwards, Greece became the most enthusiastic supporter of the federal model and the strengthening of the supranationality of European institutions.

4. BASIC ARGUMENTS FOR THE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EEC

The main and most convincing arguments that PASOK used to justify to its voters the change in its stance were:

1/ That the cost of exiting the EEC would be much greater than staying within its structures. This was a logical argument that convinced even the most skeptical. At the same time, it presented a party that sacrificed a fundamental position for the sake of national interest. Regarding the referendum “to decide by the people,” PASOK referred the decision and the responsibility for its conduct to the “privileges of the President of the Republic,” essentially, in other words, to the Greek calendars.

2/ That PASOK did not change but the EEC did. In the very first year of his administration, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, after the Summit in Brussels (June 1982), in a press conference he granted, stated that he was “enthusiastic” about the atmosphere of unity he encountered and he had never seen it before.” As he mentioned “While there were disagreements regarding the formulation of certain positions—interesting disagreements—basically there was a convergence of political line on at least three different issues. The first concerns the relations between Western Europe, the USA, and the Soviet Union… The second is the issue of Lebanon, the Palestinian issue, the Middle Eastern issue… Third, there was a declaration regarding the common economic policy that we will follow. I believe it is a very balanced position.”

It is clear that Andreas Papandreou is more willing to talk about a “turn” of the Community and the abandonment of previous positions, rather than about the turn of PASOK. As he emphasized later, “I am really leaving this time more satisfied than ever. Believe that I always felt that Europe would not manage to acquire personality, to gain stature, in order to be able to play a role. I think that the Conference is leading me to revise this view. If we hold on to what we said, it will be a historic change.”

3/. Η «στροφή» ως αποτέλεσμα των επιτυχών διαπραγματεύσεων της κυβέρνησης με την ΕΟΚ , of the resonance of its positions, of the transfer of resources, and the enhancement of Greece’s international role. In the European elections of 1984, in a campaign leaflet, titled “30 Months in the EEC“, PASOK was informing the Greek people about its achievements: “The position of PASOK for an autonomous Europe between the two superpowers is steadily gaining ground. The PASOK Government is waging a determined fight. Today there is a Greek voice in Europe…” also, “It was agreed on a series of measures for the protection of industry, as well as for the transfer of resources from the EEC Funds to the Greek Economy, additional financing for large developmental projects.” and still, “maintaining prices for the Greek producer, above the level of inflation, in contrast to the general rule of decreasing agricultural income, which has prevailed in recent years in the Common Market.” So, with such successes, it is in our interest to stay in the Community!

5. The IMAGE OF THE EEC IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF PASOK or THE MILKING OF THE COW

The most common and cynical expression for the general perception that Greece has of the EEC is that which refers to the “milking of the cow.” This image obviously also applies to PASOK, which managed the first years of the country’s accession to the EEC. It is a fact that before taking office, inspired by dependency theories, the EEC in its political discourse was depicted more as a political threat (bogeyman) and an obstacle to “national independence” and “self-sufficient economic and social development,” rather than as a community of interests from which Greece could draw economic benefits. The political dimension of the EEC – as a negative parameter – remained strong in PASOK’s political discourse during the early years of the government, despite the change in stance.

The image, that is, of the EEC in the political discourse of PASOK largely served the internal competition of the parties. For this reason, often the changes in the party’s line had no reflection on the anatomy of the EEC issue and in the rhetoric of the officials. This is evident from the fact that several years after the shift (for some even to this day), the inward-looking, anti-Western political discourse was maintained within PASOK, while references to the Community, whether in a positive or negative way, decreased. However, the issue of “EEC,” after the consent of 1987, ceased to be a casus belli in the confrontation between PASOK and New Democracy.

PASOK discovered, relatively early, that the EEC could be a means for the country’s distancing from American influence, the strengthening of democracy and popular sovereignty, as well as the elevation of the Community to a bridging force between the “developed North and the underdeveloped South.” By the end of the second governmental term, the image of the Community had become much more attractive in the eyes of PASOK’s officials and supporters.

6. CONCLUSIONS

I. Verification of the Taggart & Szczerbiak Theory

The Ovidian transformations of the PASOK political line towards the EEC confirmed the theory of Taggart & Szczerbiak that the issue of the EEC is used by opposition parties as an electoral strategy to mobilize and rally voters, rather than by governing parties. In the case of PASOK, through its political discourse, we observed a steady shift from the complete rejection of the EEC at its founding to milder tones as it approached power and full integration into the European system by the end of its second governmental term. The same occurred with other social democratic parties in Europe, such as the Labour Party in Britain and the Socialist Party in France. The theory is also confirmed by the following: The ideology of a party is not necessarily revealing of its position towards the Community.

II. Verification of Moravcsic’s Theory

The PASOK, as a government, abandoned negative rhetoric and actively participated in the organs and processes of the EEC, with proposals and initiatives that strengthened Greece’s position in Europe and the international arena. No one can dispute that PASOK played a leading role in shaping a regional policy that prioritizes the economic and social cohesion of the Community. The approval of the Structural Funds was the result of the significant pressures exerted by PASOK, but also of the strategy it followed towards the EEC for reducing interregional disparities. Thus, the theory of Moravcsik was confirmed, that in the negotiations of the EEC, the results are determined by the power and interests of the member states, but also that small countries (such as Greece) can achieve significant results when they act rationally.

ΙΙΙ. Verification of Intergovernmental Theory

The political discourse and party line of PASOK validated the theory regarding the redistributive consequences of intergovernmental negotiations and the “two-level” strategy in addressing internal pressures (Moravcsic and Putnam).

IV. Verification of Downs’ Theory

The theory of politically determined and economically cyclical electoral needs (A. Downs) was verified, which found its expression in the economic policy and political discourse of PASOK during its second governmental term and particularly during the pre-election period of 1989, with a significant cost for the smooth adjustment of Greece to the demands of the program for the completion of the Internal Market.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kazakos, P. 2001, “Between State and Market,” Athens
Mediterranean Studies Center, Aletheia Publications 1981, “Transition to Socialism,” International Scientific Seminar, 30/6-3/7/80, Athens
Declaration of Government Policy “Contract with the People”, 1981, ed. PASOK
Ioakeimidis, P. 1988, “The Transformation of the EEC – From the ‘Mandate’ to the Single European Act,” ed. Papazisis
Government Program Statements, Parliamentary Proceedings 22.11.1981
European Council, 26.11.1981, Speech by A. Papandreou, published by PASOK
Perrakis St., – Grigoriou P., 1994, “Greece in the Processes of European Integration” The Memorandum, March 19, 1982
Spinelli, A. 1984, “Draft Treaty for the Establishment of the European Union,” Proceedings of the European Parliament 14.2.1984
PASOK Conference 1984, ed. PASOK
Pagkalos, Th. 1985, Speech at the Intergovernmental Conference, ed. PASOK
Damanaki, M., 1985, Enlargement of the Community with Spain and Portugal, Discussion in the Parliament, Proceedings 4.11.1985
Memorandum 1986, for the Strengthening of Economic and Social Cohesion
Pangalos, Th., 1987, Single European Act, Parliamentary Proceedings, 14.1.1987
Papandreou, G., “1974-1990, In the Orbit of History,” ed. Papazisis
“Third Four-Year Program,” 1989, ed. PASOK
Lyrintzis, C., 1990, “Populism: The Concept and Practices” in “Elections and Parties in the 1980s,” ed. Themelio
Demertzis, N., 1990, “The Greek Political Culture in the 1980s,” in “Elections and Parties in the 1980s”
Tsoukalas, K., 1982, “The More General Meaning of Elections and Their Prospects” in “Political Science Review,” issue 2.
Androulakis, M. 1992, “META”, Livani Publishing.
Verney, S., 1996, “The Greek Socialists” in “Political Parties and the European Union”, edited by John Gaffney, Routledge London & New York
PASOK, Announcement E.G. 1.3.1996
Papandreou, A., Speech in Heraklion, Crete, 17.17.1979, published by PASOK
Papandreou, A., Speech in Alexandroupoli, 16.5.1981, ed. PASOK
Verney, S., 1990, “From the “Special Relationship” to Europeanism: PASOK and the European Community, 1981-89” in the “Greece, 1981-89:The Populist Decade”
Verney, S., 1989, “Political Parties and Integration into the EEC, 1974-1979: A Foreign Eye” in “Contemporary Issues,” issue 38, May 1989.
Parliament, 1981, Minutes of the discussion on the Programmatic Statements of the Government, 22.11.1981
PASOK, 1983, ^10thSession of the Central Committee, Speech by Andreas Papandreou
PASOK, 1983, “The First 2 Years of Change”, party pamphlet
Featherstone, Kevin., 1994, “Political Parties”
Valinakis, 2003, “Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy, 1949-1988,” ed. Paratiritis
Charalambopoulos, I., 1983, Program of the Greek Presidency, speech at the European Parliament, ed. PASOK
European Council Fontainebleau, 1984, Speech by Andreas Papandreou, ed. PASOK
Moravcsic Andrew, 1993, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach” in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, Dec.1993
Putnam, R., 1998, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:the Logic of Two.level Games”
Kazakos, P., 1994, “Greece and the EC: historical review” in “Greece and EC: Membership Evaluated”, Pinter, London 1994
Simitis, K., 1985, Speech “The Economic Stabilization Program” in “The Policy of Economic Stabilization,” published by “Knowledge”
Caramanis, V.C., 1999, Paper “Political Culture, Socialist Neo-Revisionism and the State in Change: Implications for Accounting Professionalism”
Michelogiannnis, S., Proceedings of Parliament 14.1.1987 – Discussion on EEP
European Council Brussels, 29-30.6.1987, Speech by A. Papandreou
European Council Copenhagen, 4-5.12.87, Speech by A. Papandreou
Papandreou, A., 30.6.1982, Press Conference, Brussels
PASOK, 1984, Campaign Brochure “30 Months in the EEC”
Szczerbiak, A. & Paul Taggart, 2000, “Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanization, SEI Working Paper No.36
Mouzelis, N., & G. Pagoulatos, 2002, “Civil Society & Citizenship in Postwar Greece”

Word count (the main text): 7988

karamanou@ath.forthnet.gr

www.karamanou.gr

May 30, 2005